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Federalism in the Era of International
Standards: Federal and State Government




A TAILORED APPROACH TO PREEMPTION ANALYSIS FOR
REGULATIONS GOVERNING MERCHANT VESSEL SAFETY AND
VESSEL-SOURCE POLLUTION PREVENTION
The defining feature of merchant vessel safety and vessel-source pollution
prevention regulation in the 21st century will be the increasingly dominant
role of international standards, developed by the member nations of the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and binding on the United States
by treaty. The prominent role of international standards calls for a critical
review of the national approach to maritime preemption analysis; one that is
grounded on the text and structure of the Constitution yet recognizes the
unique and pervasive role of international law in contemporary maritime
regulation.
*Editor's Note: This is the fourth part of a four part article. Part I appeared in the July 1998 issue and
examined the constitutional allocation of federal and state powers relevant to the regulation of merchant
vessel safety and vessel-source pollution prevention. Part II appeared in the October 1998 issue and
examined the principal international agreements and U.S. statutes that are relevant in a preemption
analysis. Part III appeared in the January 1999 issue and examined the problems associated with the
traditional approach to maritime preemption analysis. In this final part, Professor Allen proposes a new
approach to maritime preemption analysis.
As this final part was being set by the printer, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Intertanko
v. Locke, a decision by the Ninth Circuit that is analyzed in both the third and fourth parts of this article.
See United States v. Locke, 67 U.S.L.W. 3671 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1999) (Nos. 98-1701 and 98-1706).
**Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the Law and Marine Affairs Program, University of
Washington (Seattle). J.D., University of Washington.
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A. Principles Underlying the Proposed Approach
The operative principle of preemption is supremacy of federal law on
subjects over which the executive and legislative branches of the federal
government have been delegated constitutional authority. 0 51 The approach
that follows rests on a conviction that the purposes and objectives behind the
conventions, statutes, and regulations that make up the federal law on
merchant vessel safety and vessel-source pollution prevention will be
undermined by state or local laws that disrupt uniformity or deny foreign
vessels the benefits of reciprocity.
1. The Constitutional Basis for Maritime Preemption Analysis
Preemption analysis begins with the text of the Constitution. 0 5 2 To "form
a more perfect Union," Article VI of the Constitution provides that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding .... 1053
Some have suggested that in deciding whether federal law displaces state
laws on the same subject the courts should weigh the respective federal and
state interests. 0 54 However, Article VI does not contemplate such a
balancing test. 0 55 Whatever may be the merits of an "interests" analysis in
horizontal choice of law decisions, 10 56 the Court decided long ago that
105 1See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-06 (1819) (holding that the federal
government "though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action").
10 521n addition to the text of the Constitution, the courts will look to the Constitution's structure, the
relevant historical materials, and the "basic principles of our democratic system." U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 806 (1995).
1053 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
'
054See J. Nowak & R. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 9.1, at 320 (5th ed. 1995) (concluding that "[o]f
necessity, the nature of the problem of discovering congressional intent has resulted in judicial ad hoc
balancing.... Where there are no indicia of congressional intent the Court may have to balance the state
and federal interests, to achieve this end"); Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16
Hastings Const. L.Q. 69 (1988) (suggesting an approach to preemption that balances federal and state
powers, rather than a categorical approach such as the "occupation of the field" test).
'
0 5See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) ("[tlhe relative
importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law,
for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail.") (quoting Free v. Bland,
369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).
t056This article adopts the vertical-horizontal conflict of law classification to distinguish between
conflicts involving two or more sovereigns ("horizontal" choice of law) and those involving a choice
among governments within a hierarchy ("vertical" choice of law).
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Article VI requires that state law yield when in conflict with federal law. 10 57
Any weighing of the respective federal and state interests is properly made
by the legislative and executive branches of the federal government when
they exercise their constitutional authority to enact federal law.
2. Maritime Preemption Analysis Turns on More than Just Congressional
Intent
When it abandoned the Varnville-Rice per se "no coincidence" rule, 0 58
the Supreme Court thereafter held that the touchstone for supremacy of
federal law is the purpose or intent of Congress. 10 59 However, because
federal law includes more than just statutes, the courts' preemption analysis
must also give effect to the intent underlying the nation's treaties and federal
regulations.
State law may be displaced by federal law expressly, by implication, or
when the state law conflicts with federal law. The distinctions are neither
rigid nor clear. 1060 Express preemption challenges to state laws may require
construction of a treaty, federal statute, or regulation (sometimes all three),
to determine the domain of the preempted field. Implied field preemption
generally presents a more difficult task for the courts in their search for
Congress' and the President's intent. 061 Implied preemption occurs when
the scheme of federal regulation is "sufficiently comprehensive to make
reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary
regulation," or "the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject."' 1 62 A federal purpose to displace state law on a subject may be
expressed in the text and statutory structure of one or more federal statutes.
Federal intent may also be found in treaties and customary international law
binding on the U.S. and in regulations promulgated by federal agencies
charged with implementing federal statutes or international agreements.
Similarly, careful evaluation of each component of the relevant federal
l0 57See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,210-11 (1824) (rejecting New York's argument that
conflicting federal and state laws should be viewed "like equal opposing powers").0 5SSee supra Part III at notes 760-64.
'
0 59Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citation omitted).
10 60English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990) ("[bly referring to these three categories,
we should not be taken to mean that they are rigidly distinct. Indeed, field pre-emption may be understood
as a species of conflict pre-emption: A state law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with
Congress' intent (either express or implied) to exclude state regulation.").
10 61Presidential or executive branch agency intent is important where the relevant "federal" law is a
treaty or international agreement or an agency regulation.
1062 Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
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regime, including its international law components and federal regulations,
is necessary to determine the pervasiveness of the scheme.1063
3. The Prominence of International Law in Merchant Vessel Safety and
Vessel-Source Pollution Prevention
This article urges a fresh perspective on maritime preemption analysis;
one that acknowledges the growing importance of international law in
prescribing merchant vessel standards and enforcement mechanisms. Marine
transportation, like commercial aviation, is quintessentially transnational. To
enhance public order in maritime trade and transportation, the member
nations of the IMO have negotiated a number of conventions that promote
national interests while protecting the global marine environment. 1064 The
President and the Congress, exercising the federal treaty power, have bound
the nation to the IMO conventions on merchant vessel safety and pollution
prevention, 10 65 and have concluded a number of bilateral agreements
promoting friendship, commerce, and navigation. 10 66 The IMO regulatory
conventions both prescribe international standards and define the limits on
each party in enforcing the standards against vessels flying the flag of
another party. 10 67
If the U.S. is to continue to serve a leading role in the development and
implementation of international maritime conventions, the preemption
doctrine employed by the courts in the U.S. must recognize that the
IMO-sponsored conventions adopted by the U.S., like all treaties made
under authority of the nation, bind the entire nation, including the state and
local governments. As Justice Kennedy observed while writing for the Court
in Sky Reefer:
If the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international accords
and have a role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should
be most cautious before interpreting its domestic legislation in such a manner
as to violate international agreements. 1068
10 631d. at 714 ("[t]he question whether the regulation of an entire field has been reserved by the
Federal Government is, essentially, a question of ascertaining the intent underlying the federal scheme.").
l0 64When the U.S. ratified the Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, 9 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044 (1948) (creating what is now the IMO), the only exception
the U.S. entered concerned the effect of the Convention on U.S. laws governing restrictive business
practices and antitrust. See 6C Benedict on Admiralty, Doe. No. 12-1A, at 12-59 (7th rev. ed. 1997).
'
0 65 See supra Part II at § IV.C.
10 66 See supra Part II at note 454.
10 67 See supra Part II at § IV.C.
1068See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539, 1995 AMC 1817
(1995).
The Ninth Circuit's finding in Intertanko v. Locke 0 69 that international
conventions set only "minimum" standards, and that individual state and
local governments within the nation are free to depart from the conventions'
standards, may result in the very kind of violation against which Justice
Kennedy warned. t0 70 Under the Supremacy Clause, the IMO regulatory
conventions are the supreme law of the land. State law "must yield when it
is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty or of an
international compact or agreement."' 1 7 1 Thoughtful commentators have
pointed out that state law practices often tend to escape international law
scrutiny. 1072 The extent to which the preemptive effect of an international
agreement turns on whether the agreement is self-executing or, if executory,
has been implemented by the elected branches of the federal government, is
debatable.1073 That debate is largely irrelevant in the context of this article,
however, owing to the reciprocity statutes and other legislation that
expressly confer on the executive branch the discretion to accept a foreign
vessel's compliance with the IMO convention standards as satisfying the
conditions for U.S. port entry. 10 74 The relevant inquiry in a preemption
analysis involving an international convention is not, as the Ninth Circuit
seemed to believe, 10 75 whether "strict" international uniformity is wise as a
matter of policy. That is a question for Congress and the President. When the
federal government has exercised its authority on behalf of the nation as a
whole, a state "cannot refuse to give foreign nationals their treaty rights
because of fear that valid international agreements might possibly not work
1069148 F.3d 1053, 1998 AMC 2113 (9th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied with dissenting
opinion, 159 F.3d 1220, 1999 AMC 729 (9th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3671 (U.S.
Apr. 23, 1999) (No. 98-1706) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 487-88, 1984
AMC 1027 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985
AMC 2395 (1985)).
10 70See supra Part III at note 979 and accompanying text.
'
0 7 tUnited States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 231 (1942); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37
(1796).
'
0 72Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994
Sup. Ct. Rev. 295, 297.1073See id. at 330 (concluding that "Congressional approval of international law (either through the
treaty process or through statutory enactment) is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for
invalidation of state law on the grounds of inconsistency with international law."). In its appeal in
Intertanko v. Locke, the U.S. took the position that the preemptive force of a treaty does not depend on
whether it is self-executing or executory. See Brief for Intervenor-Appellant, United States, International
Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, at 28 (9th Cir. No. 97-35010) (arguing that
"[w]hether a treaty is self-executing is relevant to whether it has certain affirmative domestic legal effects
(such as authorizing enforcement in court by private parties or imposing legal obligations on government
officials), but that question is irrelevant to whether the treaty has the negative effect of preempting state
law.").
1°74 See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. §§ 3303 and 3711.
'
0 75See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 492, 1984 AMC 1027 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985)).
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completely to the satisfaction of state authorities."' 10 76 If a treaty, together
with any other related federal law, occupies the regulatory field in which a
challenged state law falls, the state law is preempted. Similarly, if the state
law conflicts with the relevant treaty, the state law is displaced.
In evaluating the preemptive effect of the IMO regulatory conventions,
the courts must not overlook the conventions' quid pro quo approach to
standard setting. 1077 One of the most compelling incentives for many nations
to agree to the IMO standards is the understanding that if they do agree, and
vessels flying their flag meet those standards, the vessels' compliance
generally satisfies the requirements on that subject for entry to the ports and
waters of the other parties to the convention. With respect to foreign vessels
flying the flag of a party, the international conventions on marine safety and
pollution prevention are not merely "model acts" that the parties are free to
adopt and later modify to suit their national, state, and local interests.
Although it is true that the conventions set the minimum standards that each
party must prescribe and enforce against vessels flying its flag, 10 78 they set
the standards that each party may enforce on vessels flying the flag of any
other party to the convention, unless the party enters an appropriate
exception or reservation to the convention. 0 79
4. Rejecting the Presumption against Preemption of State Law on
Merchant Vessel Safety and Vessel-Source Pollution Prevention
The approach advocated in this article rejects, as inapposite, the presump-
tion against preemption in challenges to state regulations governing mer-
t
°
76 Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 198 (1961).
1077Cf. Bodansky, Protecting the Marine Environment from Vessel-Source Pollution: UNCLOS Ill
and Beyond, 18 Ecology L.Q. 720, 726 (1991) (concluding that development of the international regime
in large part "has resulted from a desire by maritime states to forestall unilateral coastal state regulation").
1078 See supra Part II at note 402 and accompanying text (describing national obligation under the LOS
Convention to ensure vessels flying the nation's flag meet standards that are at least as strict as the
generally accepted international standards designed to promote marine safety and prevent pollution).
'°
9 That this reflects the understanding of the U.S. government is apparent from the U.S. approach to
the double-hull tanker amendment to article U/13F and I/13G of the MARPOL Convention, discussed in
Part II of the article. Had the U.S. understood the convention to permit the parties to unilaterally prescribe
requirements applicable to foreign tankers that exceeded the MARPOL standard without entering an
appropriate reservation, no such action by the U.S. would have been necessary. See supra Part II at note
543 and accompanying text. Although it is true that Congress gave the Secretary discretion to prescribe
standards that exceed relevant international standards in 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a), MARPOL regulation 1/l 3F
and I/13G is the only international standard the U.S. has rejected, and the national government did so by
entering an express reservation statement with the IMO. See supra Part III at note 997 (research and
conclusions by NRC). Moreover, the Coast Guard has recently determined that international standards
have now "caught up" to the U.S. domestic standards, obviating unilateral action by the U.S. See U.S.
Dep't of Transp., Unified Agenda, Nov. 29, 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 62,111 (1996).
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chant vessel safety and vessel-source pollution prevention. 0 80 The presump-
tion arose in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,0 8 1 which involved a challenge
to Illinois' regulation of grain warehouses within the state. It is clear from
that case that the states had historically regulated grain warehouses and that
the federal government did not intervene in the regulatory field until
1916.1082 The original federal statute at issue in the challenge was enacted in
1916 and included an express state law saving clause. 0 83 A 1931 amend-
ment somewhat ambiguously made the power, authority, and jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Agriculture over federal license holders "exclusive."' 1 84
The challengers argued that the 1931 amendment effected a complete
occupation of the field, thus preempting state regulation even on warehouse
subjects for which no federal law applied. In assessing the effect of the
federal laws, the Court observed that Congress may pursue one of three
governing approaches to commerce regulations. First, it may, if it chooses,
take unto itself all regulatory authority. Alternatively, it may choose to share
the task with the states. Finally, it may adopt as policy the state scheme of
regulation. Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas then posited that "[tihe
question in each case is what the purpose of Congress was."' 0 85 In
ascertaining Congress' purpose or intent with respect to the regulation of
warehouses-a subject historically regulated by the states1086-the Court
announced its "assumption" that Congress did not intend to supersede the
state's police powers, "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." 087
The presumption against preemption announced in Rice is inappropriate
in the era of international standards, where the "federal" law on the subject
matter often originates in a treaty. Treaties necessarily bind the entire nation
1080See supra Part I at note 229 and accompanying text.
'o"8331 U.S. 218 (1947).
10121d. at 238 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
'°8Id, at 222-23 ("nothing in this Act shall be construed to conflict with, or to authorize any conflict
with, or in any way to impair or limit the effect or operation of the laws of any State relating to
warehouses [or] warehousemen") (quoting United States Warehouse Act, 39 Stat. 486, § 29 (1916)).
08Id. at 224 (quoting 46 Stat. 1463 (1931)).
0 5 1d. at 230.1086The Court cited two of its earlier cases to support its assertion that the state traditionally occupied
the field of warehouse regulation: Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 113 (1876) (upholding state
regulation of grain warehouse rates), and Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 148-49
(1944). Similarly, in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 520, 525 (1977), the Court cited an earlier case
as authority for the assertion that the field of meat packing regulation was traditionally occupied by the
states. Later cases tended to invoke the presumption without first verifying the predicate of historical state
regulation.
'
0 71d. (citing Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926), and Allen-Bradley
Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942)).
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in the absence of a limiting reservation by the federal government.o10 8 Any
presumption that the states are free to legislate within a field covered by a
treaty binding on the U.S. is therefore inconsistent with the nature of
international law instruments. 0 8 9 The presumption is also counterfactual
and inconsistent with Congress' historical view. As early as 1972, Congress
acknowledged the "long history of preemption in maritime safety matters"
founded on the need for "uniformity applicable to vessels moving in
interstate commerce."10 90 The Supreme Court has even articulated a pre-
sumption that vessels engaged in foreign commerce will be regulated by the
federal government. 10 9' Indeed, under the Court's dormant Commerce
Clause cases, the states were constitutionally barred from regulating subjects
in interstate or foreign commerce that were national or which required
uniform national rules. 10 92 Finally, when the Supreme Court has already
ruled that a state is preempted from legislating upon a particular subject, as
the Court has done in a challenge to Washington state's tanker regulations
in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 10 93 any presumption against preemption of
state law on that same subject ignores the effect of precedent.
Eliminating the presumption against preemption in maritime preemption
cases will not only level the field in the courts' approach to international law
and give effect to the Court's precedents, doing so will also obviate the need
to define the states' "police powers" and determine which are "historic" and
therefore benefit from the presumption. Thoughtful scholars have high-
lighted the fact that the concept of state "police powers" is at best undefined
and perhaps even indeterminate. 0 94 Moreover, the Court has never articu-
lated a test for determining which of those arguably indeterminate powers
are "historic." A careful analysis of the history of merchant vessel safety and
pollution prevention regulation in the U.S. is unlikely to lead to the
conclusion that the states "historically" regulated merchant vessel construc-
tion, design, manning, and equipment or the licensing and training of
1088See supra Part I at note 352 and accompanying text (discussing reservations); see also supra Part
III at note 736 and accompanying text.
10 9S5ee Brilmayer, supra note 1072, at 333 ("If judicial modesty is motivated by separation of powers
concerns, then the determinative factor should be the attitude of the federal elected branches toward the
states' international law violations. And it seems plausible to presume that unless they have otherwise
explicitly so provided, the federal elected branches would not want states to have that freedom.").
1°9°S. Rep. No. 92-248 at 20-21 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1341. The Report was
prepared by the Senate Commerce Committee.
1"9'See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449, 1979 AMC 881 (1979)
("vehicles of commerce by water being instruments of intercommunication with other nations, the
regulation of them is assumed by national legislation.") (quoting Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 456, 470 (1875)); cf. The Federalist No. 11 (Hamilton), supra Part I at note 20.
'
092 See supra Part III at § VI.A.2 (discussing the rule in Cooley v. Board of Wardens).
1093435 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
1°94 See, e.g., Ely, supra Part I at note 11l; Frankfurter, supra Part I at note 112.
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mariners other than state harbor pilots. It is therefore not the case that the
federal government has displaced the states from a historical regulatory role
in these subjects. 10 95
5. Resolving Regulatory "Overlaps" that Substitute State or Local
Government Judgments for those of the Federal Government
The Supremacy Clause dictates that the federal judgment that a vessel is safe
to navigate United States waters prevail over the contrary state judgment. 1096
Under the proposed approach (discussed more fully in § VII.B.4.d below),
state or local government regulations applicable to vessels that hold federal
certificates-particularly state laws that overlap with the federal regime-
would be closely scrutinized, as instructed by the Supreme Court in Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. 1097 Overlapping state or local laws would be upheld
only when federal law expressly or impliedly authorizes the states to enact
requirements that differ from or are stricter than those prescribed by the
federal law. 10 98 Although saving provisions for more stringent state stan-
dards are common in federal laws governing pollution discharges and waste
disposal, 10 99 Congress rarely includes them in vessel safety and pollution
prevention statutes,1 '00 and has never entered a state law saving exception or
reservation to an IMO regulatory convention."l 0 ' Moreover, Congress has
delegated to the Secretary of Transportation the discretion to accept
compliance with the IMO regulatory conventions in satisfaction of U.S. port
entry requirements." t0 2
When federal and state governments have both exercised their lawmaking
powers on a subject which the Constitution commits to concurrent jurisdic-
tion, the preemption doctrine must address the validity of state laws that are
designed to fill gaps in the federal legal regime and state laws that overlap
109 5See supra Part II at note 567 (identifying sources that describe the 160-year-old federal program
of merchant vessel safety and pollution prevention).
l°96Ray, 435 U.S. at 165.
10971d. at 164-66.
1°98See id. at 165 (noting that the "federal scheme thus aims precisely at the same ends as does" the
state act).
'
099See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (CWA saving clause for more stringent state standards or limitations
respecting the discharge of pollutants or control or abatement of pollution); 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (authorizing
more stringent state standards for waste disposal); 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (authorizing more stringent state
standards for air pollutant emissions). But see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d
156 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (state CWA authority to regulate point source discharges does not carry with it the
authority to regulate the point source itself).
1 l°°There is some dispute over whether OPA 90 § 1018 provides such authority. See infra § VII.B.4.e.
'l lSee supra notes 1064 and 1078 and Part Ill at note 997 (discussing the limited exceptions entered
by the U.S. to IMO regulatory conventions).
'l°2 See 46 U.S.C. §§ 3303, 3711, and 9101.
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with the federal regime. Article VI itself provides little guidance. The
Court's analysis of the validity of interstitial and overlapping state laws
applicable to federally licensed and inspected vessels is set out in Gibbons
v. Ogden, 10 3 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,' 10 4 Douglas v.
Seacoast Products, Inc.,110 5 and Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 110 6 Those
cases demonstrate that when the object of the state regulation is a vessel
licensed and inspected by the federal government to engage in a particular
activity in U.S. waters, the Court has never upheld overlapping state laws.
Gibbons, discussed in Part I of this article, examined the extent to which
a state may restrict the operation of a federally enrolled and licensed vessel
in state waters."10 7 In Huron, the Court upheld the application of a city
smoke abatement ordinance to federally licensed and inspected vessels only
after finding that there was no overlap between the federal and local
laws. 110 8 In Douglas, the Court examined the text and prior judicial
treatment of the federal vessel enrollment and licensing act (there was no
legislative history)."1 9 The Court noted that its decision in Gibbons might
be read to suggest that the federal act "ousts all state regulatory authority
over federally licensed vessels," but that later decisions had not extended the
federal domain that far. Instead, Gibbons was read as permitting states to
impose on federally licensed vessels "reasonable, nondiscriminatory con-
servation and environmental protection measures otherwise in their police
powers.'t110 Neither Douglas nor Gibbons addressed whether federal
statutes other than the enrollment and licensing act further restricted the
reach of state regulation,"" and in Huron the Court did not reach the
issue. 1112 None of the cases directly addresses the extent of state regulatory
control over vessels that do not hold federal licenses. 1 3
In Ray, the Court affirmed its allegiance to Douglas and Huron, holding
110322 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
1104362 U.S. 440, 1960 AMC 1549 (1960).
1105431 U.S. 265, 1977 AMC 566 (1977).
1106435 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
07 See supra Part I at notes 133-49.
110362 U.S. at 445-46. The majority concluded that because the federal and city laws aimed at
different purposes, there was no overlap.
1109431 U.S. at 274-75.
1 1Id. at 277.
111 'The majority did conclude, and Justices Rehnquist and Powell agreed, that the Submerged Lands
Act did not countermand the preemptive effect of the federal licensing acts. 431 U.S. at 289 (Rehnquist
and Powell, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1112362 U.S. at 442 n.1.
1113Neither Gibbons nor Douglas directly addresses state regulatory authority over foreign vessels. To
the extent that a federal tank vessel holds a certificate of compliance from the Coast Guard issued under
the authority of 46 U.S.C. § 3711, the certificate should be equivalent in effect to the license examined
in Gibbons and Douglas. See Douglas, 431 U.S. at 280-81 (discussing the rights conferred by
enrollment and license).
Vol. 31, No. 1
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that the states may constitutionally apply reasonable, non-discriminatory
conservation and environmental protection measures to federally licensed
vessels. 1114 But the Court was quick to point out that in none of the cases
upholding state conservation and environmental protection measures did the
state law address the "same object" as federal law.1115 At first glance, the
Ray decision may look like the position the dissenters took in California v.
Zook.' 1 6 However, the state regulations in Zook were identical to those
prescribed by the ICC; the state did not impose additional or more stringent
standards. The regulated vessels in Ray were presumed to hold all required
federal licenses to operate, yet the state purported to add additional
requirements as a condition of operating in state waters.
When state statutes address a subject that is comprehensively regulated by
federal statutes, regulations, and treaty obligations, as is the subject of
merchant vessel safety and pollution prevention, any court reviewing those
state laws in a preemption challenge should be guided by Ray. Unless the
governing federal law prescribes only "minimum"' 117 standards or otherwise
provides state authority to issue different or more stringent standards,"'18 the
overlapping state regulation is displaced. 1" 9 Any other approach would
deny the supremacy of the federal law.
Section 1018 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was construed by one court
as authority for overlapping state regulation of merchant vessel safety and
pollution prevention," 120 but history, precedent, and legislative intent are to
1114435 U.S. at 164 (citations omitted).
1115Id. (citations omitted).
1116336 U.S. 725, 749 (1949) (Burton, Douglas, and Jackson, JJ., dissenting) ("[olnce Congress has
lawfully exercised its legislative supremacy in one of its allotted fields and has not accompanied that
exercise with an indication of its consent to share it with the states, the burden of overcoming the
supremacy of the federal law in that field is upon any state seeking to do so.").
lll7 See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147-48 (1963)
(distinguishing the Court's earlier decision in Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961), because the
federal law in Campbell prescribed uniform standards, while the federal law at issue in Florida Lime
prescribed only minimum standards). In Ray, the Supreme Court rejected the state of Washington's
argument (based on Florida Lime) that Title II of the federal PWSA set only minimum standards that the
states were free to exceed. 435 U.S. at 168 n.19.111 Even in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, the Ninth Circuit recognized the need to identify
congressional authorization for overlapping state ballast water discharge laws. Though the court's resort
to the CWA is questionable, the decision does not disturb the general rule against overlapping state laws
in the absence of congressional authorization. See supra Part III at § VI.C. 1.
1119The state can not avoid preemption by arguing that the federal CDEM standards are merely
minima. The Court in Ray rejected that argument where the federal statute evidenced a congressional
intent that the standards would be promulgated and enforced at the national level, and that vessels
meeting those standards would be privileged to navigate in U.S. waters. 435 U.S. at 168 n.19.112 0See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053, 1059-60, 1998 AMC 2113 (9th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g
en banc denied with dissenting opinion, 159 F.3d 1220, 1999 AMC 729 (9th Cir. 1998), petition for cert.
filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3671 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1999) (No. 98-1706).
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the contrary. 1 ' The relevant language of § 1018 is identical to the saving
clause in the Clean Water Act (CWA) and several other statutes, none of
which has ever been construed to authorize state regulation of merchant
vessel safety and pollution prevention.'" 2 2 In Ray, the Supreme Court
rejected the state of Washington's argument that the CWA, with its state law
saving clause, authorized the state to enact stricter state requirements for
tankers. 123 Finally, the OPA 90 Conference Committee Report makes clear
that the Act was not intended to disturb the Supreme Court's decision in
Ray. 1124
6. New Directions for Agency Preemption Determinations
Federal agencies regularly prepare "federalism" statements which exam-
ine the preemptive effect of the regulations they promulgate.' t25 The Court's
decisions in United States v. Shimer,t" 26 Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. de la Cuesta,1127 Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical
Laboratories, Inc., t t2 8 and City of New York v. FCC,1129 as well as Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,"130 demonstrate the
importance of agency regulations in preemption analysis.
Agency federalism statements may enter into the courts' preemption
analysis in several respects. First, they may serve as direct evidence of an
intent to preempt. The Supreme Court has "held repeatedly that state laws
can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes." '" 3'
Congress need not expressly confer on a federal agency authority to issue
regulations that preempt state laws for the agency's regulations to have such
a preemptive effect."t 32 The agency's decision to preempt state regulation is
to be upheld unless it is clear that Congress would not have sanctioned a
112 10PA 90 § 1018 is analyzed supra Part II at § V.D.2.b. The question whether § 1018 authorizes
regulatory "overlap" is discussed supra Part III at § VI.C.2.b.
122See supra Part II at notes 691-700 and accompanying text.
123435 U.S. at 178 n.28 (rejecting state's argument that the CWA, the Coastal Zone Management
Act, or the Deepwater Ports Act demonstrates congressional intent for coexistent state regulation of
tankers).
124See supra Part II at note 710 and accompanying text.
1125See supra Part III at note 810 and accompanying text.
1126367 U.S. 374 (1961).
1127458 U.S. 141 (1982).
112'471 U.S. 707 (1985).
1129486 U.S. 57 (1988).
130467 U.S. 837 (1984).
"'
3 1Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713 (citations omitted); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 735-37
(1949).
1132 City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. at 64 (holding that "a pre-emptive regulation's force does not
depend on express congressional authorization to displace state law."); Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 154; see also
Project: The Role of Preemption in Administrative Law, 45 Admin. L. Rev. 107 (1993).
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preemption of state authority in the subject area regulated by the agency.' 133
In general, where "Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his
discretion, his judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine
whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily." ' 1 34 If
the agency's "choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should
not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that
the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned."' 1 35
Second, an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute for
which Congress has delegated to the agency enforcement responsibility is
entitled to deference.11 36 Section 1018 of OPA 90 provides that nothing in
the Act precludes the states from imposing additional liability or require-
ments with respect to the discharge of oil or removal of such oil. 1137 As with
§ 360k of the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976 the Court examined in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, in § 1018 of OPA 90 Congress failed to define the
term "requirement." ' 138 A majority of the Court in Medtronic gave "sub-
stantial weight" to the implementing agency's interpretation of the relevant
statute.' 139 Yet the Ninth Circuit gave no deference to the Coast Guard's
preemption conclusions when the court set about construing § 1018 in
Intertanko v. Locke. 1140
Deference to agency conclusions is particularly appropriate in the inter-
pretation of a maritime convention provision where the agency providing the
interpretation represented the nation at the IMO when the convention was
11 33Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 153-54; see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496-97 (1996)
(holding that an agency's interpretation of the preemptive effect of its regulations is entitled to deference
where Congress has delegated authority to the agency, the agency's interpretation is not contrary to a
statute, and agency expertise is important to determining preemption). But see also id. at 512 ("[w]here
the language of the statute is clear, resort to the agency's interpretation is improper.") (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
l"3 4Shimer, 367 U.S. at 381-82.
1135Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 154.
''
36See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984).
113733 U.S.C. § 2718(a).
1138Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 481-82 (discussing a similar legislative construction exercise in Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), in which it referred to "requirements" many times "linked
with language suggesting that its focus is device-specific enactments of positive law by legislative or
administrative bodies, not the application of general rules of common law by judges and juries.").
1139See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496 (Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
concurring in Part V); see also Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 (1991) (agreeing
with the submission in the amicus brief of the U.S. expressing the views of the EPA, the agency charged
with enforcing the Act).
1140See supra Part III at § VI.C.2.b(3).
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under development. 114 1 Agencies will also generally be the best source of
current information on a treaty's status and provisions. Standards set by IMO
conventions are subject to frequent amendment, and the agencies that
represent the U.S. to the IMO and serve on its specialized subject matter
committees will generally be in the best position to assess the effect of state
laws on the current international regime binding on the U.S.
Two other aspects of agency federalism conclusions may be relevant in a
preemption analysis. The Court has concluded that federal agencies are
"uniquely qualified" to provide the executive branch's views on whether a
state regulation is likely to frustrate the purposes and objectives of the
federal regulatory scheme. 1 42 Where Congress has given an agency discre-
tion to accept compliance with international standards, or in determining the
extent to which requirements for U.S. flag vessels should be harmonized
with international standards, the agency's purposes and objectives may be
undermined by state actions that destroy an objective to pursue international
uniformity. Finally, agencies such as the Department of State will generally
be the source of the executive branch's views on the foreign affairs and
foreign commerce implications of the state regulation.' 143 Those views are
generally dispositive. 14 4
Agencies must, however, give careful attention to their preemption
analyses. Moreover, when an agency decides to preempt state and local laws
it should expressly declare its intent in the final rule and define the
preempted domain. Where the agency has declined to formally announce its
intent to preempt state regulation at the time it promulgates the federal rules,
the courts are likely to conclude that the agency did not intend that effect.' 145
The Coast Guard's silence on whether it intended that its tanker ballast water
regulations would preempt state regulation may help explain the result in
"41The Coast Guard, NOAA, Department of Defense, and Department of State represent the U.S. at
the IMO. See supra Part I at note 74.
1142 See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496 (federal agency to which Congress has delegated authority to
implement an act is "uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form of state law 'stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,' and
therefore, whether it should be pre-empted."); see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 245 (1959) (deferring to an agency's determination that state regulation would interfere with
the national policy).
1143See, e.g., supra Part III at note 785 and accompanying text (describing the State Department's
views on the need for international uniformity in vessel standards).
"44As Justice Jackson observed in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.:
"[w]hether a state action undermines the foreign affairs of the nation is generally a question for the
President and Congress, whose judgments are binding on the judiciary." 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); see
also O'Connor, supra Part I at note 376, at 36-37.
'14'See Tribe, supra Part I at note 204, at 501-02 n.l (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis of
agency preemption in Hillsborough).
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Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond.1 46 Regrettably, no comprehensive
guidelines are presently available to assist federal agencies in assessing the
federalism implications of their regulations. In developing such guidelines,
it should be borne in mind that the agency's preemption decisions will be
more useful to state governments, the courts, and others seeking to
determine the agency's intent if the rulemaking notices published in the
Federal Register included the agencies' classification of the subject matter of
the regulation (see § VII.B.1 below), a complete list of the relevant statutes
and treaties that provide the authority for the rule or are relevant to the
agency's preemption analysis (see § VII.B.2), the agency's conclusions
regarding field preemption (see § VII.B.4), and a statement of the agency's
purposes and objectives in promulgating the rule (see § VII.B.5). When the
agency's enabling statutes require the agency to consult with the affected
states before promulgating regulations (as does the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act'147), the agency should invite state comments on preemption
questions during the rulemaking process and add a section to the federalism
statement in the final rule outlining the results of its consultation with states.
B. Elements of the Proposed Approach
Merchant vessels entering U.S. ports and waterways are potentially
subject to three or more legal regimes: the flag State regime, the U.S. federal
regime (in its capacity as a port State), and any regime established by state
and local governments with jurisdiction over the port or the navigable
waterways the vessel must transit en route to or from the port. Merchant
mariners serving aboard the vessel may be subject to yet another regime if
their nationality differs from the flag of the vessel.' 148 The relationship
between the flag State and port State legal regimes and their respective
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction is governed by public international
law-primarily the LOS Convention, the IMO regulatory conventions, and
any relevant FCN treaty, but also including provisions for international
comity. The relationship between the state and local government regime and
the federal regime, including its international law components, is the subject
of this analysis.
The proposed approach to maritime preemption analysis follows the
Supreme Court's decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,1149 both because
Ray is the Court's last decision in a maritime regulatory preemption
146 See Part III at note 890.
1147See 33 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2); 46 U.S.C. § 3703(c)(2).
1
'
48 Restatement, supra Part I at note 19, at § 402(2).
1149435 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
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challenge to state law and in recognition of the fact that when Congress
enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the Conference Committee singled
out Ray as a decision Congress did not intend to disturb in enacting the
legislation." 150 At the same time, however, the proposal is responsive to the
fact that the international and federal legal seascape has matured signifi-
cantly since Ray was decided.' 151 Any contemporary application of Ray
must therefore consider the many international and federal developments
that have occurred since 1978.
1. Step One: Classify the Subject Matter of the Inquiry
Courts have long recognized that the subject matter of the laws under
consideration often shapes the preemption analysis." 52 Classification may
provide guidance on the relevance of earlier preemption decisions. For
example, a case such as Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.," 1 53
which addressed state laws prescribing liability for oil spill damages at a
time when no international convention addressed the subject, may be of little
help in determining whether a state law prescribing English language
competency requirements for tank ship officers is preempted by federal
statutes or the IMO conventions.' 154 Correctly classifying the subject matter
affected by the state laws under challenge is also critical to a determination
of the domain of the relevant federal laws in the second step in the proposed
approach.
Should the courts continue to apply a presumption against preemption of
'150See supra Part 11 at note 689 and accompanying text.
15 'When the Court issued its decision in Ray, the 1973 MARPOL Convention, its 1978 Protocol, and
the 1978 SOLAS Protocol were not yet in force; the STCW Convention was just being negotiated (and
was to be substantially amended in 1995); and the ISM Code was not yet even under discussion. The
pervasiveness of international standards has grown substantially in the two decades since the Ray
decision came down. See supra Part I1 at § IV.C.
1152Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941) (in conducting our analysis of whether the state
law frustrates the federal purpose "it is of importance that this legislation is in a field which affects
international relations, the one aspect of our government that from the first has been most generally
conceded imperatively to demand broad national authority."); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 139, 141-42 (1963) (distinguishing food quality cases from cases involving interstate
carriers because the latter is a "field of paramount federal concern"); Hillsborough County, Fla. v.
Automated Med. Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 714, 718 (1985) (expressing reluctance to infer preemption
of local health and safety regulations); see also Tribe, supra Part I at note 204, §§ 6-7 to 6-20, at 417-68
(distinguishing among physical commodities, transportation, natural resources, and other subjects).
115'411 U.S. 325, 1973 AMC 811 (1972).
1154In Askew, the Court did not reach the question whether the federal water pollution act's state law
saving clause would permit the state to impose oil spill response equipment requirements, after noting
that such a requirement might be subject to a preemption challenge after the Coast Guard promulgated
its regulations on the subject. See Askew, 411 U.S. at 336-37 ("[rlesolution of this question, as well as
the question whether such regulations will conflict with Coast Guard regulations ... should await a
concrete dispute.").
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a state's historic police powers, the state regulation's classification will be
useful in determining whether the states have "traditionally" legislated on
the subject. Finally, classification will be useful in determining whether the
subject matter is one for which Congress has prescribed a program of
"cooperative federalism."' 55 Where Congress has prescribed a program of
cooperative federalism, the courts are less likely to find that a state law
frustrates the purposes of the relevant federal law.' 56 By contrast, when
Congress has adopted a program of international cooperation, which
promotes uniformity in standards and reciprocity, the court is more likely to
find that states which prescribe differing standards or deny foreign vessels
the reciprocity benefits provided by the conventions and U.S. implementing
statutes frustrate the purposes of the federal regime.' '57
This article envisions a subject matter classification that distinguishes
among regulations governing: (1) merchant vessel construction, design,
equipment, and manning (CDEM); (2) merchant mariner certification and
training; (3) vessel navigation and other on-board operations; (4) port and
waterways operations and management; and, (5) vessel discharge prohibi-
tions and pollution liability laws. This taxonomy is consistent with the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea' 58 and the principal IMO conventions. It
is also consistent with the Court's analysis in Ray and Askew, 1 59 and with
the structure of federal statutes and regulations in Titles 33 and 46 of the
U.S. Code and Code of Federal Regulations. The proposed scheme does not
address other relevant subjects, the most important being control over siting
decisions for waterfront facilities and oil terminals. 1 60
155See supra Part III at § VI.A (generally describing cooperative federalism approaches under the
CWA and CZMA); 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1) (prescribing cooperative federal-state approach to management
of "land and waters resources" in the coastal zone).
1156Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 614-15 (1991).
157See, e.g., Ray, 435 U.S. at 168 (holding that states may not impose standards that are stricter than
those Congress has "accepted as a result of intemational accord.").
1158See supra Part II at § IV.A; Bodansky, supra note 1077 (suggesting a classification that
distinguishes discharge standards, CDEM standards, and navigation regulations). The LOS Convention
imposes specific limits on the jurisdiction of a coastal State to impose CDEM standards, other than those
prescribed by international law. See, e.g., LOS Convention, supra Part 1I at note 384, at art. 21(2)
(limiting coastal State jurisdiction over CDEM of foreign vessels in innocent passage to generally
accepted international standards). Coastal States may, however, establish stricter discharge and liability
standards (subject to any voluntary limitations assumed by other treaties, such as the MARPOL
Convention). Id., art. 21(1)(f). The LOS Convention taxonomy was selected in the proposed approach to
maritime preemption analysis because the convention has been widely adopted and dovetails nicely with
the tMO sponsored conventions arid their allocation between flag State and port State jurisdiction and
responsibility.
1 ' 59Ray provides the elements for analysis of vessel design, construction, equipment, and operations
requirements. See supra Part 1I at notes 630-42 and accompanying text. Askew addressed only liability
for oil discharges. See supra Part II at note 658 and accompanying text.
"l6°See DuBey, Control of Oil Transport in the Coastal Zone, 56 Or. L. Rev. 593 (1977). In Pacific
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2. Step Two: Determine the Domain of the Existing Federal Regime
Applicable to the Subject Matter(s)
The modem federal regulatory regime for merchant vessels is pervasive.
Its international, statutory, and agency-promulgated components reach
nearly every aspect of a vessel's design, construction, equipment, and
manning, as well as the licensing, qualification, and training requirements
for seafarers, port and vessel operations, and vessel-source pollution."1 61
Too often, preemption analyses neglect to consider the breadth, detail, and
purposes of the international law sources that constitute an increasingly
important component of the "federal law" of merchant vessel regulation in
the U.S. The proposed preemption approach calls for a thorough inventory
of the relevant international law components, including the IMO conven-
tions and any relevant treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation, to
determine what standards they set, whether they evidence an intent to
establish international uniformity, and their reciprocity provisions.
At the same time, the proposed approach rejects the categorical approach
to federal statutory analysis adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Intertanko v.
Locke,' 162 which sweeps virtually all subjects other than vessel design into
an "operations" subject matter category and focuses on a single act to
ascertain the "overarching" federal intent with respect to tank vessel
regulation in the U.S. 163 The approach calls instead for an inventory of all
federal laws that apply to the subject matter of the state law under challenge
to determine the standards they set and their purposes and objectives.' 1 64
Only after conducting a complete inventory of the standards prescribed by
all relevant federal laws will the court be able to assess whether the federal
scheme is sufficiently "pervasive" to warrant an inference that federal law
occupies the field. The legislative and executive purposes and objectives
underlying each of the federal laws identified in this step will also be a key
factor in both the field and conflict preemption steps below.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 n.25
(1983), the Court noted that the state's control over energy facility siting and land use decisions was
preserved by Congress.116 tEven vessel air pollutant emissions from marine diesel engines are now coming under direct
federal regulation. See Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from New CI Marine Engines, 63 Fed. Reg.
68,508 (EPA 1998).
1162See supra Part III at § VI.C.2.
11631d. The court ignored the purposes and objectives behind the Ports and Waterways Safety Act and
the IMO conventions after concluding that a single act--OPA 90-reflected Congress' "full" purposes
on the subject tanker regulation. See Intertanko, 148 F.3d at 1062. See also supra Part III at § VI.C.I,
which discusses the same court's same approach in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond.
164One of the last maritime cases to attempt to comprehensively survey the domain of federal laws
relevant to a preemption analysis was Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 4-8, 1937 AMC 1490 (1937).
This is not to suggest that it is the courts' task to consider preemption grounds not raised by the parties.
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3. Step Three: Identify Commerce Clause "Purposes and Objectives" for
Later Conflict Preemption Analysis
The chorus of criticism for the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine grows
louder each year.1165 Whatever may be the merits of the doctrine general-
ly, 1166 with the possible exception of the doctrine's "discrimination against
commerce" strand, 1167 it is now largely irrelevant in maritime preemption
cases owing to the maturity of the federal legal regime. Once Congress and
the President have exercised the federal commerce powers on a subject, by
statute, international agreement, or regulation, the commerce power is no
longer "dormant," and a dormant Commerce Clause analysis is inappropri-
ate.11 68 Thereafter, any state action is properly scrutinized under an Article
VI preemption analysis,' 169 not under the Commerce Clause.
The proposed approach rejects the balancing test occasionally employed
to weigh the putative state benefits against the burden the state law imposes
on commerce. The balancing test lacks textual support l170 and is poorly
suited to vertical choice of law analyses.' 17' However, because both
Congress and the states 172 have relied on the check provided by the
1165See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 520 U.S. 564, 619 (1997)
(Thomas and Scalia, JJ., and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing, among other objections, the fact that the
doctrine "surely invites us, if not compels us, to function more as legislators than as judges.") (citation
omitted).
11661d. at 577 (reasoning that avoiding "economic balkanization" and the retaliatory acts of other
states that may follow "is one of the central purposes of our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.")
(citations omitted).
1167So long as states like Washington enact laws which may be found to have a discriminatory impact
on foreign vessels or seamen (such as by imposing English language competency requirements and
requirements for state-approved training programs), there will be a need for scrutiny under the
discrimination against foreign or interstate commerce strand.
]168See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) ("the dormant
Commerce Clause, in both its interstate and foreign incarnations, only operates where the Federal
Government has not spoken to ensure that the essefitial attributes of nationhood will not be jeopardized
by States acting as independent economic actors.").
169This article does not address challenges under the Equal Protection, Due Process, or Privileges and
Immunities Clauses.
117 0 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 609 (Thomas and Scalia, JJ., and Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
''
7TThe balancing approach is inappropriate in vertical choice of law analysis because
there is no scale in which the balancing process' can take place. There is no way to say with
assurance in a particular case that the federal interest asserted is more or less important than the
interest in preserving uniformity of result with the state court. Even if there were such a scale, the
weights to be put in it must be whatever the judges say they are.
C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 404 (5th ed. 1994); see also Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[tihis process is ordinarily called
'balancing,' but the scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the interest on both sides are
incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is
heavy") (citation omitted).
'
1 72The state of Alaska conceded that its regulations governing placement of ballast water in a
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balancing test, it cannot be rejected without careful consideration of the
federal commerce related purposes and objectives in any related Article VI
preemption analysis. The courts must therefore ensure that any legislative or
executive branch purpose to promote national or international uniformity or
to obtain reciprocal treatment for U.S. interests engaged in foreign com-
merce is protected under the "frustration of purpose" step in the conflict
preemption analysis." 173
The "national versus local" test adopted by the Supreme Court in Cooley
v. Board of Wardens 1 74 to determine the states' legislative competence over
interstate and foreign commerce is similarly inappropriate in a mature
federal maritime regulatory regime. The Cooley rule suffers the same
definitional shortcomings as the "maritime-but-local" test occasionally
invoked in admiralty choice of law." 175 At the same time, it is important to
recognize that Cooley has long served as a key blueprint in the Court's
maritime federalism architecture, providing a judicial check on state
legislation on subjects that are national or require a uniform national rule.' 176
As recently as 1978, the Supreme Court, in Ray, reaffirmed its earlier
conclusion in Kelly v. Washington that ship design and construction are
matters for national attention "which could not properly be left to the diverse
action of the States."' 177 The Court in Ray also applied the Cooley rule in
assessing the validity of a state requirement for escort tugs." 78 In fact, most
of the Supreme Court's maritime Article VI preemption decisions were
written against the Cooley backdrop. It would not be overly bold to suggest,
therefore, that Congress may have legislated over the last century and a half
under the reasonable presumption that the states were barred by the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause precedents from legislating on subjects that were
"national." Any failure by Congress to expressly preempt state law on such
subjects should not, therefore, be construed as evidence that Congress
intended to permit state regulation in a field subject to federal control.
vessel's cargo tanks were invalid as an unreasonable burden on interstate and foreign commerce. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 1978 AMC 1697, 1701 (D. Alaska 1978).
173 See infra § VII.B.5 (describing conflict preemption approach).
117453 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
1175See Robertson, supra Part I at note 17, at 341 (observing that the words have no meaning, much
like "traditional police powers of the states").
1176For example, in California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949), in which a bare majority of the Supreme
Court first rejected the Vamville-Rice per se "no-coincidence" rule (discussed supra Part III at notes
762-64), the Court treated the "familiar" Cooley rule of uniformity versus locality as one of the three
prongs of the federal preemption doctrine. Id. at 728. One can only speculate whether the majority would
have rejected the Varnville-Rice rule if Cooley had not at the time operated as a limit on state legislative
authority.
1177435 U.S. at 166 n.15.
1178ld. at 179.
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4. Step Four: Field Preemption Analysis
When federal law occupies a regulatory field, overlapping state laws are
preempted without regard to whether they actually conflict with the federal
scheme. 1 79 The challenge often lies in determining just what "field" is
occupied by the federal regime."180 Federal intent to preempt state action
may be express or implied by the federal laws' structure and purpose. I t8'
With few exceptions, Congress has not expressly preempted the states from
regulating merchant vessel safety and vessel-source pollution prevention.
Thus, the principal focus of this section will be on implied preemption.
a. Principles of Implied Field Preemption
In preemption analysis the courts look to federal law as a whole and to the
federal law's object and policy."t 82 Evidence of federal intent to occupy the
field may be found in treaties, statutes, and regulations. The Court has long
stressed that the touchstone for preemption analysis is whether Congress (or
the President) intended that federal law would be exclusive., 83 However,
the Court has never held that federal law preempts state action only when
Congress expressly states such an intent." 84 Congressional intent to exclu-
sively occupy a field may be evidenced in several ways:
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. ... Or
the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject.... Likewise, the object sought to be obtained
117 9Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941) ("where the federal government, in the exercise
of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation ... states, cannot,
inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail, or complement, the federal
law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.").
"180See id. at 78-79 (Stone, J., dissenting) ("Every act of Congress occupies somefield, but we must
know the boundaries of that field before we can say that it has precluded a state from the exercise of any
power reserved to it by the Constitution.") (emphasis added).t1 51 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (a conclusion that state law is preempted "is
compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose.").
1182Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) ("[o]ur ultimate task in any
pre-emption case is to determine whether state regulation is consistent with the structure and purpose of
the statute as a whole. Looking to 'the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy ..
(quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987)).
"83Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
184Of course, nothing in Article VI requires Congress to express an intent to preempt state law as a
condition of federal supremacy.
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by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal
the same purpose." 185
Although the courts rarely conclude that a federal interest is so dominant that
the federal system will be presumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject,"186 the Supreme Court has established a presumption that
vessels engaged in foreign commerce will be regulated by the federal
government. " 187
The Rice test quoted above recognizes that an "intent" to preempt state
law need not be express, and in fact may not even be the intent of a single
Congress. The legislative and executive branches may build a "pervasive"
scheme of federal regulation over a period of years, even decades. Perva-
siveness of the federal regime is seldom a sufficient condition for a finding
of implied field preemption; however, the Court's historic unwillingness to
infer that Congress intended to leave a regulatory vacuum in the legal regime
is strong evidence that pervasiveness is a necessary condition."t 88 Even
where no "gaps" appear in the national regulatory scheme, the courts may be
reluctant to find that the field is occupied to the exclusion of state or local
government regulations adapted to true "local peculiarities"' 189 in the
absence of proof of an actual conflict.
The Supreme Court has identified other specific indicia of congressional
intent to displace state laws, two of which are particularly relevant to
maritime preemption analysis. When Congress has imposed a mandatory
duty on an agency to regulate a subject matter the court may infer that
Congress intended that federal law would occupy the field." 190 An intent to
preempt state authority may also be inferred where federal law provides that
the activity which is the subject of the state law under challenge may occur
"only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of
federally certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal
'185Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
''
86See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
"187 See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449, 1979 AMC 881 (1979)
("vehicles of commerce by water being instruments of intercommunication with other nations, the
regulation of them is assumed by national legislation.") (quoting Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 456, 470 (1875)).
"88See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 207-08 (1983); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 13, 1937 AMC 1490 (1937) (reasoning that "lilt
would hardly be asserted that when Congress set up its elaborate regulations as to steam vessels, it
deprived the state of the exercise of its protective power as to vessels not propelled by steam.").
"189 See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 175, 1978 AMC 527 (1978) (distinguishing
between vessel operation rules adapted to "local peculiarities" and those which represent a contrary
judgment).
"9°Cf. Ray, 435 U.S. at 162-63; City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624,
638-39 (1973).
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commands."' 191 When coupled with Congress' recognition of the long
history of preemption in maritime safety matters and the need for uniformity
applicable to vessels moving in interstate commerce," 92 these precedents
provide a useful starting point for analyzing the preemptive intent of the
merchant vessel safety and pollution prevention treaties, statutes, and
regulations.
b. Field Occupation by International Conventions
Field preemption analysis involving subjects for which international
agreements provide the governing standards necessarily presents a special-
ized inquiry owing to the established rule that such treaties bind the entire
nation." 793 The Ninth Circuit's approach to international law in Intertanko v.
Locke, in which it treated its earlier conclusion in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Hammond that international law merely prescribes minimum standards as if
it were a rule of law rather than an individualized (and, I believe, incorrect)
finding,"1 94 charts an unwise and legally unsupported course for maritime
preemption analysts. Unlike federal statutes or regulations, which may or
may not entail an intent to displace state laws on the same subject,
international agreements impose a national obligation absent an appropriate
exception or reservation." 195
The reporters for the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States take the position that all international agreements to which
the U.S. is a party preempt state authority on the same subject as a matter of
law. 1196 The limited saving clauses of the principal IMO regulatory
conventions evidence a design by the drafters to limit the jurisdiction of the
parties to prescribe standards that differ from those adopted in the conven-
'
1 9
'Lockheed, 411 U.S. at 634; see also Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 614
(1991) (suggesting that such a regime implies field preemption).
1192S. Rep. No. 92-248, supra note 1093, at 20-21.
193See supra § VII.A.2.
'
1 94 See supra Part III at § VI.C.3.c(l) and particularly note 978. Such sweeping statements about
"international treaties" demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the inquiry. Each treaty must be
examined individually to determine the intended effect of the standards it prescribes. A given treaty might
prescribe minimum standards for the parties to apply to vessels flying their flag, yet preclude higher
standards for foreign vessels calling on their ports. The effect of the standards might also vary according
to the waters in which the vessel is located (internal waters, territorial seas, and exclusive economic
zones). Finally, no analysis would be complete without also examining any preemption or saving clauses
in the treaty or reservations entered by the U.S. in ratifying the treaty.
'
1 95 Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding
upon each party throughout its territory. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra Part I at
note 221, at art. 29; Restatement, supra Part I at note 19, at § 102(3), cmt. f and introductory note to pt.
Ill.
196 See Restatement, supra Part I at note 19, at § 115 cmt. e (observing that the matter has not been
adjudicated).
Merchant Vessels 37January 2000
38 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
tions.i 197 A court may reasonably conclude that Congress and the President
intended, when they bound the nation to the IMO regulatory conventions
and delegated port State control authority to the Coast Guard,' 198 to displace
state law on the subjects covered by the conventions. Should the court adopt
that conclusion, state and local government prescriptive jurisdiction on those
subjects covered by the convention is displaced. A state may not attempt to
add to or take from the force and effect of a treaty.' 199 More particularly, as
the Supreme Court in Ray made clear, states may not impose vessel
standards that are stricter than those Congress has "accepted as a result of
international accord."'1200
c. Finishing the Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. Analysis
In both Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond,12 0 ' and Intertanko v. Locke, 12 0 2
the Ninth Circuit treated Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.1203 as if it was an
exhaustive analysis of the preemptive effect of the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act (PWSA). In neither case did the circuit court examine the
congressional intent factors that persuaded the Supreme Court that Title II
occupied the field of tank vessel design and construction to determine
whether those factors supported a finding that Title II also occupies the field
for the other subjects it addresses, including vessel manning, personnel
qualifications, operations, cargo handling, ballasting, and equipment. 1204
"
97See, e.g., SOLAS, supra Part 11 at note 420, at Preamble (calling for "uniform principles and
rules") and art. VI(d) (providing that "[a]ll matters which are not expressly provided for in the present
Convention remain subject to the legislation of the Contracting Government."); STCW Convention,
supra Part H at note 388, at art. V(3) (providing that "[a]ll matters which are not expressly provided for
in the Convention remain subject to the legislation of the Parties."). Of course, each party retains the
jurisdiction under the LOS Convention to prescribe more stringent standards for its own vessels as a
matter of domestic law. See LOS Convention, supra Part II at note 384, at art. 94 & 211(2).
"
9 See Part II at § V.A.2; Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-324, § 602, 110
Stat. 3927 (1996); Exec. Order 12,234, 45 Fed. Reg. 58,801, 3 C.F.R. pt. 277 (1981) (designating the
Coast Guard as the port State control authority).
ll99See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941).
12°°Ray, 435 U.S. at 168. The Court also held that it is not within the power of a state "to impose
different or stricter standards than Congress has enacted with the hope of having [the U.S. standards]
internationally adopted .. " Id.
1201726 F.2d 483, 1984 AMC 1027 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985).
1202148 F.3d 1053, 1998 AMC 2113 (9th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied with dissenting
opinion, 159 F.3d 1220, 1999 AMC 729 (9th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3671 (U.S.
Apr. 23, 1999) (No. 98-1706).
1203435 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
12°4See PWSA, supra Part II at note 587, at tit. II, § 201(3), 86 Stat. at 427, codified at 46 U.S.C. §
3703.
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(1) What the Court in Ray Held and Why
In Ray, the Court first noted an overlap between Title I and Title II of the
PWSA, 120 5 then held that state regulation of merchant vessel equipment
requirements and vessel safety standards are preempted by Title I of the
Act. 2 0 6 In reaching its conclusion on Title I preemption the Court relied in
part on the Act's legislative history, which revealed that the House changed
the wording of the original bill because the earlier version did "not make it
absolutely clear that the Coast Guard regulation of vessels preempts state
action in this field."' 120 7 The Court next concluded that the field of tank
vessel construction and design standards is fully occupied by Title II of the
PWSA. 20 8 In reaching its conclusion that Title II occupied the field, the
Court relied on the statutory structure of the Act. The structural features
the Court cited include: (1) a requirement that the Secretary establish rules
and regulations as may be necessary with respect to the design, construction,
and operation of tankers; (2) a requirement that the Secretary, in establishing
the required rules, consider factors prescribed by the Act and consult with
certain state and other government officials; (3) a requirement that the
Secretary inspect covered vessels to verify their compliance with the Act and
the Secretary's rules, and that the Secretary issue certificates or endorse-
ments to qualified vessels documenting their compliance; (4) authority for
the Secretary to exercise his or her discretion to accept, in lieu of inspection,
a foreign vessel's certificates of inspection "recognized under law or treaty
by the United States"; (5) a provision that "such endorsement shall serve as
a permit for such vessel to operate"; and, (6) a prohibition on any vessel
carrying on the covered trade without the required inspection certificate or
endorsement. 120 9 The Court concluded that the statutory pattern of Title II
"shows that Congress, insofar as design characteristics is concerned, has
entrusted to the Secretary the duty of determining which oil tankers are
sufficiently safe to be allowed to proceed in the navigable waters of the
United States."' 21 0 That statutory pattern revealed that Congress "intended
uniform national standards for the design and construction of tankers that
205Ray, 435 U.S. at 161.
1206Id. at 270 ("[rlelying on legislative history, the appellants argue that the preclusive effect of [33
U.S.C.] section 1222(b) is restricted to vessel equipment requirements. The statute, however, belies the
argument, for it expressly reaches vessel 'safety standards' as well as equipment."). The preemptive
effect of § 1222(b) [now renumbered § 1225(b)] is not limited to state regulation of tanker safety and
equipment standards. It is, however, limited to "those requirements or standards 'which may be
prescribed [by the Coast Guard] pursuant to this chapter.'" Id. at 171. The relevant "chapter" is 33 U.S.C.
ch. 25, in which Title I of the PWSA was codified.
1207435 U.S. at 174 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 92-563, at 15 (1971)).
120 Id. at 165 n.15.
"291d. at 161-63.
12 °Id. at 163.
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would foreclose the imposition of different or more stringent state require-
ments.",12 11
The Supreme Court's conclusion that Title II fully occupies the field is
buttressed by the Court's precedents holding that an intent to preempt state
authority may be inferred where federal law provides that the activity which
is the subject of the state law under challenge may occur only by federal
permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified
personnel and under a system of federal commands.12 1 2 Or, as the Court put
it in Ray, "[t]he Supremacy Clause dictates that the federal judgment that a
vessel is safe to navigate United States waters prevail over the contrary state
judgment."' 21 3 Until such time as the Secretary exercises his or her Title I
authority, states remain free to enforce "local laws" addressed to a purpose
other than those embodied in the federal laws, 1214 but they may not prescribe
requirements on vessels operating in state waters that are different from or
more stringent than the federal standards.
(2) Applying the Court's Reasoning to the Remaining Title II Subjects
Although it was unnecessary in Ray for the Court to determine the
preemptive effect of Title II on subjects other than those challenged in the
Washington Tanker Act, the Court's reasoning extends equally to tank
vessel equipment, operations, personnel qualifications, and manning stan-
dards. 21 5 The statute from which the Court in Ray took its guiding "pattern"
also requires the Secretary to establish requirements for tanker manning and
operations. 12 16 Congress' purpose in Title II was to require the Secretary to
121 'Id.
12 12 See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 .U.S. 624,'634 (1973).
12 13Ray, 435 U.S. at 165.
12 14Id. at 164 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit and Kelly v. Washington).
1215 "Manning" regulations refer to the legal requirements prescribing the number and grade or rating
of officers and crewmembers a vessel must carry. See, e.g., SOLAS Convention, supra Part II at note 420,
at ch. V., reg. 13; Int'l Maritime Organization Res A.481(XII) (Nov. 19, 1981), reprinted in 6D Benedict
on Admiralty, Doc. No. 14-7 (7th rev. ed. 1997); 46 U.S.C. ch. 8101-8301 (master and officer
requirements for U.S. vessels) and ch. 87 (unlicensed personnel requirements for U.S. vessels). Manning
regulations must be distinguished from the regulations prescribing the requirements for an individual to
qualify to hold a license or merchant mariner document. A manning regulation might require a vessel to
carry a chief engineer. A license qualification regulation would prescribe the age, medical standards,
experience, and testing requirements a person must meet to hold a license as a chief engineer, See, e.g.,
STCW Convention, supra Part 1I at note 388 (passim); 46 U.S.C. § 7101.
12 16See 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a). Tanker "operation" is not defined under Title II of the PWSA; however,
it is apparent that the term overlaps to some extent with the Secretary's authority to prescribe "vessel
operating requirements" under Title I of the PTSA. The Court in Ray provided some guidance when it
distinguished between state regulations "based on water depth ... or other local peculiarities," which
would be analyzed under Title I, and those more akin to design judgments made by "federal authorities
in pursuit of uniform national and international goals," which would be analyzed under Title II. Ray, 435
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establish a body of regulations broad enough to serve as a measure of a tank
vessel's fitness to transport oil in U.S. waters. The Court expressly identified
the tanker safety regulations in 33 C.F.R. part 157 and 46 C.F.R. parts
30-40 as the relevant Title II regulations under consideration. 1217 Both
include tanker operations requirements. The Court also noted that the Title
II rules the Secretary was required to establish included operations rules and
rules "to insure that adequately trained personnel are in charge of tank-
ers." 1218 The manning requirements for U.S. merchant vessels are prescribed
by the Coast Guard and noted on the vessel's certificate of inspection. 1219 A
vessel may not lawfully operate in U.S. waters unless it has on board the
personnel complement called for in those manning requirements and each
such individual holds the appropriate license or merchant mariner's docu-
ment. 122
0
Thus, had the Ninth Circuit completed the statutory analysis begun by the
Supreme Court in Ray, the court would have discovered that the Ray
reasoning compels the conclusion that Title II of the PWSA occupies the
field for each of the subjects listed. Accordingly, unless § 1018 of OPA 90
later "de-occupied" the PWSA Title II subject matter field, as defined by the
holding and reasoning in Ray, state laws prescribing standards on those
subjects are displaced. 1221
(3) The PWSA Structure is Carried Forward into the Crew Qualifications
and Training Provisions in Title IV of OPA 90
State and local governments have historically prescribed standards for
harbor, river, and port pilots, 12 2 2 but they have not otherwise regulated
merchant mariner license qualification or training standards. In OPA 90,
Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation to evaluate the merchant
mariner training and qualification standards for foreign nations that issue
documents for tanker officers and crewmembers. 1223 The U.S. had signed
the STCW Convention at the time OPA 90 was enacted, but the Senate had
U.S. at 175. The distinction is best understood by examining the kinds of operations listed in each title.
Compare 46 U.S.C. § 3703 (directing Secretary to prescribe regulations for tanker operations) with 33
U.S.C. § 1223 (providing Secretary authority to prescribe vessel operating requirements).
12 17Ray, 435 U.S. at 162 nn.ll and 12.
128Id. at 163 nn.13 and 14.
121946 U.S.C. § 8101(a).
12201d. § 8101(d).
122 1See supra Part III at notes 1009-10 and accompanying text.
1222State regulation of pilots for foreign vessels and U.S. vessels sailing under register is preserved
by 46 U.S.C. § 8501.
122 3OPA 90 § 4106(a) and (b), 104 Stat. 513-14, codified at 46 U.S.C. § 9101.
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not yet given its advice and consent to ratification. 1224 The Secretary was
directed by Congress to ensure that the mariner qualification and training
standards for each issuing nation are "at least equivalent to United States law
or international standards adopted by the United States."' 1225 OPA 90's
legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended that the Secretary
would look to the STCW Convention in setting the standards.1226 Congress
delegated to the Secretary authority to deny entry to vessels whose crews do
not hold certificates meeting the OPA 90 § 4106 standards.1227 As with Title
II of the PWSA, Congress made no provision in § 4106 for state regulation
of mariner qualification or training requirements, or for the states to
prescribe requirements that were different from those accepted by the
Secretary under authority of § 4106. When the U.S. ratified the 1978 STCW
Convention in 19911228 (the year after OPA 90 was enacted) it entered no
reservations to preserve the authority of state or local governments within
the U.S. to prescribe standards that are more stringent than the standards
prescribed by the Convention. 229 The U.S., like all parties to the Conven-
tion, has agreed that in its port State control capacity it will accept valid
certificates issued by another party.1230
d. Gaps and Overlaps
Part I of this article' 231 suggested that for purposes of preemption
analysis, state regulations can be grouped into three categories: 12 3 2 (1) state
regulations that adopt the requirement or standard set by federal law and
provide that the federal requirement is also enforceable under state law (a
"duplicate" state enforcement rule); 12 3 3 (2) state regulations that address a
subject for which no federal rule or standard exists ("interstitial" state
1224 See 62 Fed. Reg. 34,506 (1997).
1225 OPA 90 § 4106(a) and (b), 104 Stat. 513-14, codified at 46 U.S.C. § 9101.
1226 See supra Part II at note 565 and Part III at note 1014.
12271Id.
1228See 62 Fed. Reg. 34,506, 34,506 (1997).
1229 See 6D Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 14 -1 (7th rev. ed. 1997) (listing parties that have ratified
the agreements and any reservations or declarations).
1230 See STCW Convention, supra Part II at note 388, at art. X.
1231See supra Part I at notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
1232 A fourth category, not addressed in this article, includes state laws that impose liability for a
regulated activity's conduct or consequences without attempting to directly regulate the activity. See,
e.g., Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494 (11 th Cir. 1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998)
(construing express preemption clause in the Federal Boat Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. § 4306).
1233 See, e.g., California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) (upholding state prosecution for violation of
ICC regulation); cf. 33 U.S.C. § 2719 (authorizing states to enforce federal financial responsibility
requirements).
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regulations); 1234 and, (3) state regulations that address a subject already
regulated by federal law, but prescribe a standard that is different from the
federal standard ("overlapping" state regulations). 1235 Duplicate state en-
forcement regimes applicable to federally licensed or inspected vessels may
give rise to preemption challenges if the state purports to deny a federal
license holder the opportunity to carry on the licensed activity in state
waters. 1236 Interstitial and overlapping state regulations raise fundamentally
different questions. 237
(1) Neither a Subject Matter nor a Purpose Test
Part III of this article highlighted inconsistencies in the Supreme Court's
analytic frame of reference in preemption cases, focusing alternatively on
the "field," "subject matter," "object" and "purpose" of the respective
federal and state laws, to determine whether the challenged state law fell
within or beyond the federally occupied field. 1238 More recently, the Court
has held that principles of field preemption apply against any state law
relating to the "issue" of the federal standard. 1239 On occasion, the Court has
also held that the test for field preemption is not whether the laws overlap in
their subject or purpose, but whether the state law interferes with "federal
1234See, e.g., Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 1937 AMC 1490 (1937) (upholding state regulation
of motor tugs, where such tugs were not regulated by the federal government).
1235See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978) (examining state
restriction on tanker size).
1236See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 280-81, 1977 AMC 566 (1977) (holding
that Gibbons v. Ogden established the principle that a vessel's federal license implies a grant of the right
to navigate in state waters and to carry on the activities listed in the license); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) ("That no State may completely exclude federally
licensed commerce is indisputable").
'
237 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624-25, 1978 AMC 1058, 1064-65 (1978)
("[t]here is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that
Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.").
1238See supra Part III at § VI.A.3.
1239Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 104 n.2 (1992).
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superintendence of the field,"' 2 40 or Congress' intent that regulatory deci-
sions be made by a single decisionmaker.12 4 t
Resolution of the subject matter-purpose frames of reference controversy
must ultimately turn on the intent of Congress and the President in
establishing the relevant federal law scheme. Examination of the text,
structure, and legislative history of the federal laws may reveal that Congress
and the President intended that federal statutes or international conventions
would exclusively govern the regulation of a particular subject matter, such
as vessel construction, design, equipment, and manning (CDEM) standards.
Another federal regime might reveal an intent to address a particular goal or
purpose, like water quality, regardless of the source of the emissions. The
contentious cases are likely to be those in which the relevant federal regime
includes both subject matter and purpose statutory schemes, one of which
permits overlapping state requirements while the other precludes them. 242
Within the field of merchant vessel safety and vessel-source oil pollution
prevention, 1243 the subject matter-purpose distinction will be largely aca-
demic because the subject of and purposes behind the treaties, statutes, and
regulations that constitute the modern federal regime are so broad. Congress'
purpose in enacting the PWSA/PTSA was to enhance port and vessel safety
and prevent marine pollution.' 2" The recently enacted ISM Code provisions
aim to promote safety and improve compliance with environmental protec-
tion regulations.1245 A similar purpose underlies the principal IMO regula-
tory conventions. 246 State regulations, such as those challenged in Inter-
124
°Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 139, 142 (1963) ("[tjhe test of whether
both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give way, is whether both
regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they
are aimed at similar or different objectives."). Federal superintendence as a basis for a finding of field
preemption is closely related to implied field preemption where the regulated activity can occur "only by
federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified personnel and under
an intricate system of federal commands." City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624,
634 (1973); see also Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 614 (1991) (suggesting that
such a regime implies field preemption). Federal superintendence of the field may also be a "purpose or
objective" of the federal regime which should be considered in the conflict preemption step.
'
24 1Ray, 435 U.S. at 177.
12 42The Ninth Circuit concluded that Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond presented such a case. See
supra Part III at § VI.C. 1. In his dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in the case Justice White
disagreed. See supra Part III at note 857 and accompanying text.
1243At present, there is no evidence that Congress intended the federal regime for vessel-source air
emissions or for controlling the release of aquatic nuisance species through ballast water discharges to
be exclusive. See supra Part II at note 505 (describing development of MARPOL Annex VI); 16 U.S.C.
§ 4725 (saving state authority over control of aquatic nuisance species).
1244See supra Part II at note 590; Ray, 435 U.S. at 161 (the "twin goals" of the PWSA are vessel safety
and protecting the marine environment).
1245See supra Part II at note 490.
1246See, e.g., STCW Convention, supra Part II at note 388, at Preamble ("Desiring to promote safety
of life and property at sea and the protection of the marine environment ... ").
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tanko v. Locke, which are couched as oil spill "prevention" rules, 247 thus
overlap both the subject matter and purpose of the federal regime. If the
federal and state purposes are the same, and the federal and state laws are
directed at the same subject matter, the question is to what extent the states
are free to legislate different or more stringent standards than the federal
regime or to impose additional or more severe sanctions for violations than
those provided by the federal regime.
(2) Interstitial State Laws
Congress and the President may, through treaties, statutes, and regula-
tions, occupy a field without necessarily filling it with federal regulation. 248
"In such cases, any state or local action, however consistent in detail with
relevant federal statutes, is held invalid-not because of a 'dormant' federal
power thought to be constitutionally exclusive but rather because the federal
legislative scheme announces, or is best understood as implying, a congres-
sional purpose to 'occupy the field."' ' 1249 The Court is reluctant to infer field
preemption, however, if the result is to deny state competency to fill a true
"gap" in the federal regime with an interstitial state law.1250 Under such
circumstances, the Court is likely to resolve the preemption question by
reference to the conflict preemption test.125 '
(3) Overlapping State Laws
In contrast to interstitial state laws governing maritime subjects, such as
the state motor tug regulations under challenge in Kelly v. Washington, 252
overlapping state regulations that prescribe standards that are different from
1247The state "best achievable protection" regulations for tankers challenged in Jntertanko are listed
supra Part III at note 925.
1248That is, Congress may, through what Professor Tribe characterizes as a "hybrid" of Supremacy
Clause preemption and the dormant Commerce Clause, expressly or implicitly leave a regulatory
vacuum. Tribe, supra Part I at note 204, § 6-25, at 479.
1249 1d. (citing Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 Stan.
L. Rev. 208 (1959)) (emphasis in original).
1250To say that a state law fills a "gap" in the federal regime, .and is therefore interstitial, is to state
the conclusion that federal law does not completely occupy the relevant field.
125 'The Court summarizes its approach in the canon that:
the intent to supersede the exercise by the state of its police power as to matters not covered by the
Federal legislation is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to
circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other words, such intent is not to be
implied unless the act of Congress, fairly interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of the state.
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 12, 1937 AMC 1490 (1937) (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501
(1912)) (emphasis added).
1252302 U.S. 1, 1937 AMC 1490 (1937).
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or stricter than the standards prescribed by federal law, such as the Alaskan
ban on ballast water discharges challenged in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Hammond, 253 override the federal judgment within the boundaries of the
state. Such divergent state standards are generally motivated by one of two
goals: the perceived need to promulgate local rules adapted to the "pecu-
liarities of local waters," or a desire to implement a contrary state judgment
regarding the desired risk management regime for all of the state's
waters. 254
The distinction between gaps and overlaps occasionally turns on subtle
aspects of the relevant federal and state laws. In Pacific Gas & Electric
(PG&E), 255 Justice White explained that if the federal government occupies
a given field or an identifiable portion of it, the test of preemption is
"whether the matter on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way
regulated by the Federal Act."' 256 Applying this test, the Court in PG&E
concluded that federal law completely occupied the field of nuclear power
plant safety. 2 57 Accordingly, the state of California was preempted from
regulating the construction or operation of a nuclear power plant-even for
a non-safety purpose. 12 58 The Court distinguished the question of the state's
authority to authorize or withhold authorization of the construction of new
plants within the state. The state could not ban the construction of nuclear
plants out of safety concerns. To do so would conflict with the federal
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's judgment. 259 If, however, the state's ban
on new construction were grounded on a rationale other than safety, 260 the
1253726 F.2d 483, 1984 AMC 1027 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985).
1254 The difference is highlighted in Ray, where the Court distinguished between state judgments on
the "matter of safety and environmental protection generally" and those based on "water depth ... or
other local peculiarities." 435 U.S. at 175.
1255Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190
(1983).
12561d. at 212-13 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947)) (emphasis
added).
12571d. at 216.
121d. at 212 (dictum).
1259 1d. at 213 ("a state judgment that nuclear power is not safe enough to be further developed would
conflict directly with the countervailing judgment of the NRC"). Two concurring justices labeled the
conclusion dictum and "wrong." See id. at 223-34 (Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); see also Tribe, supra Part I at note 204, § 6-28, at 507 n.32 (explaining that
in Ray, "the state imposed its stringent requirements 'on the ground that [certain ships'] design
characteristics constitute an undue hazard,' a concern held by the Court to fall squarely within the field
occupied by the federal government.").
126°The Court was reluctant to scrutinize closely the state's claimed legislative purpose. PG&E, 461
U.S. at 216 ("inquiry into legislative motive is often unsatisfactory.") (citing United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)). Earlier, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, the Court was more willing to
closely examine the state's purpose. 325 U.S. 761, 780 (1945) (reasoning that state conflicts are "not to
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state's action would lie outside of the federally occupied field.' 26t The
Court's fine distinction between safety and non-safety purposes is best
explained by the fact that denying the state's authority to regulate the
economics of whether plants should be built at all would result in a gap in
the regulatory subject matter because the NRC had no authority to decide
such questions. 262 Thus, the California legislation did not represent a
substitution of judgment. 263
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.'264 provides the method for analyzing
regulatory overlaps involving merchant vessels holding federal licenses and
inspection certificates entitling the vessel to operate in a particular trade.
After setting out its conclusions on implied preemption on vessel safety and
equipment standards under 33 U.S.C. § 1222, field preemption under Title
II of the PWSA, and preemption once the Secretary acted pursuant to his
authority under Title I of the Act, the Court in Ray identified an implied "no
overlap" rule for vessels holding federal certificates. 2 65 Such vessels, the
Court held, must conform to reasonable, nondiscriminatory state conserva-
tion and environmental protection measures; however, both Ray and the
Court's earlier decision in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroitt2 66
recognized that state rules that "overlap" with federal law are invalid. 267
Under Huron and Ray, in the absence of later Congressional action to permit
overlapping state regulation on merchant vessel safety and vessel-source
pollution prevention, such state regulations are preempted under Article
VI. 1268
be avoided by 'simply invoking the convenient apologetics of the police power."') (quoting Kansas City
S. Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 233 U.S. 75, 79 (1914)).
1261The Court noted that the fact that the state purpose left it outside the occupied field would not
immunize it from a conflict preemption analysis if, for example, it frustrated a federal purpose. PG&E,
461 U.S. at 216 n.28.
1262See id. at 207-08 ("[I]t is almost inconceivable that Congress would have left a regulatory
vacuum; the only reasonable inference is that Congress intended the States to continue to make"
judgments regarding the economic aspects of nuclear power plants). The Court quoted a state law saving
clause in the Atomic Energy Act in support of its conclusion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2018.
12631n contrast to the Supreme Court's decision in PG&E, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond presents an overlap involving a contrary state judgment. Both the federal and
state statutes affected the same subject matter (vessel on-board operations) and purpose (pollution
prevention). The state rejected the federal rule, which permitted a vessel to discharge "clean" ballast
water. 726 F.2d 483, 1984 AMC 1027 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985).
1264435 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
1265See also Tribe, supra Part I at note 204, § 6-28, at 506-07 & n.32 (citing the Huron "no overlap"
rationale and concluding that "[w]hether federal licensing operates to preempt state regulation will
ordinarily depend on the respective aims of the state and federal schemes").
1266362 U.S. 440, 446, 1960 AMC 1549 (1960).
1267Ray, 435 U.S. at 164 (quoting Huron, 362 U.S. at 446). The conclusion appears in Part IV of the
Ray opinion, in which Justices Stevens and Powell joined the four-member plurality.
1268See, e.g., Ray, 435 U.S. at 164 (noting that in upholding a municipal smoke abatement ordinance,
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Any preemption decision must of course take account of the fact that the
body of federal law is developing, taking in new subjects and purposes.
Professor Tribe, for example, suggests that the Washington tanker law in
Ray could have been viewed simply as a marine pollution prevention regime,
and therefore treated like the gap-filling ordinance in Huron.2 69 But he
overlooks a key distinction between Huron and Ray. The federal domain
examined for preemptive effect in Huron included the marine boiler
inspection statutes in effect in 19601270 and the enrollment and license
statutes first examined in Gibbons v. Ogden.'271 The congressional purpose
of the inspection statutes, the Court concluded, was seagoing safety of ships
and their passengers and crews. The "sole purpose" of the Detroit ordinance
was the elimination of air pollution. 1272 The Court concluded "there is no
overlap between the scope of the federal ship inspection laws and that of the
municipal ordinance."'' 273 The Court did not reach the question whether the
city's inspection laws or its requirement that any vessel operating combus-
tion machinery in the city obtain a permit were preempted because there was
no evidence the city had attempted to enforce those laws. 1274 The preemp-
tion analysis in Ray-nearly two decades after Huron-turned on a greatly
expanded federal regime, which by then included the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972. The purpose of the PWSA (even before it was amended
in 1978 by the Port and Tanker Safety Act) extends well beyond the
"seagoing safety of vessels" domain examined in Huron, and includes the
vessel-source pollution prevention purpose of the Washington statute. 275
Even using the majority's approach in Huron, which measured overlap by
the majority in Huron "made it plain that there was no overlap between the scope of the federal inspection
laws and that of the municipal ordinance.") (citing Huron, 362 U.S. at 446). In Huron, both the majority
and dissenting justices appear to agree that overlapping state or local laws are preempted. However, they
disagreed over whether the overlap should be measured by the respective laws' subject matter (as the
dissent argued) or their purpose (as the majority held). See supra Part I at note 257 and accompanying
text; see also Tribe, supra Part I at note 204, § 6-28, at 507 n.32 (explaining that in Huron "while the
Detroit ordinance affected the same subject matter as federal law-namely, design of ships-Congress
had intended that the federal government occupy only the field of safety standards for ship design.")
(emphasis in original).
1269 Tribe, supra Part I at note 204, § 6-28, at 507 & n.32. ("The Court's distinction between Atlantic
Richfield and Huron Portland Cement illustrates the difficulty of searching for the relevant state purpose,
since it would seem that the State of Washington, by regulating only oil tankers rather than ships
generally, was concerned not with 'the seagoing safety of vessels,' the federally occupied field, but with
the effects of oil spills on the shores and communities of Puget Sound, in a manner closely analogous to
Detroit's non-preempted objective in Huron Portland Cement.").
1270363 U.S. at 445 (examining the purposes of 46 U.S.C. §§ 391-392).
127'lid. at 446-47.
12 72Id. at 445.
127 31Id. at 446.
12741d. at 442 n.1.
'
275See supra Part II at § V.C.I.
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purpose rather than just subject matter, the Court in Ray recognized that the
state tanker laws overlapped with the federal regime.
Two final qualifications to the analysis of interstitial and overlapping state
laws are necessary. First, interstitial state laws that lie outside the field
occupied by federal maritime laws must still be scrutinized under a conflict
preemption analysis. Such laws may frustrate the purposes and objectives of
the federal reciprocity statutes or statutes which have as one of their
purposes uniformity, even though they do not fully occupy the field. Second,
the validity of overlapping state laws may be affected by relevant preemp-
tion, non-preemption, or saving clauses.
e. Determining the Domain of Saving and Preemption Clauses
The national government is free to determine the preemptive effect of
federal law through saving or preemption clauses in statutes or regulations,
by negotiating appropriate terms in treaties, or by entering reservations at the
time of ratification of a multilateral convention. 276 Preemption and non-
preemption clauses, if used, help establish the domain occupied by federal
law. They are also relevant to the question whether the state law frustrates
the purposes or objectives of the federal law. Like express preemption
clauses, 1277 federal statutory provisions that "save" state regulatory authority
often require the court to determine the domain of their coverage. 1278
In Intertanko v. Locke, the state regulations being challenged overlapped
federal standards in many respects, 1279 in effect substituting the state's
judgment for that of the federal government expressed in its treaties, statutes,
and regulations. Under the Supreme Court's rulings in Huron and Ray
discussed in the preceding section, such overlapping state regulations are
preempted unless state authority for overlapping regulations is provided by
a saving clause. The U.S. joined Intertanko in petitioning the Supreme Court
1276See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra Part I at note 221, at art. 29 ("[u]nless a
different intention appears from the treaty, or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party
in respect of its entire territory."). Under article 19 of the Vienna Convention a nation may, by
reservation, limit the territorial effect of a treaty, as the United Kingdom elected to do in ratifying the
SOLAS Convention. See SOLAS Convention, 6D Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 14-1 (7th rev. ed.
1998) (citing U.K. reservation against application to its territories). Reservations are not appropriate if
expressly prohibited by the convention or if "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty."
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra Part I at note 221, at art. 19; Restatement, supra Part
I at note 19, at § 313.
1277See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 585 (1996) (court must "identify the domain expressly
preempted" by the preemption clause) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517
(1992)).
1278Generally, saving clauses are strictly construed. See IA Sutherland, supra note 216, § 20.22, at
110 (citations omitted).
1279See supra Part III at § VI.C.2 and note 936.
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for certiorari in the case. Should the Court grant the petition, it will be called
upon to determine the domain of § 1018 and whether Congress intended that
§ 1018 would authorize the states to impose overlapping vessel require-
ments. Specific questions the Court may face include: (1) whether, as Judge
Graber suggests in dissent, 1280 there is any suggestion in the text of § 1018
of OPA 90 or its legislative history that Congress intended to confer on the
states new authority over merchant vessel safety and vessel source pollution
prevention,' 28 ' and that the federal judgment that a vessel is safe to navigate
U.S. waters would no longer prevail over a contrary state judgment; 1282 (2)
the importance of the structure of OPA 90, the placement of § 1018 in Title
I, the distinct origins and evolution of Title I and Title IV, and the fact that
Congress included additional saving clauses that would be superfluous if §
1018 were intended to apply to the entire Act; 283 (3) the inference to be
drawn from the fact that the compromise bill agreed to by the Conference
Committee deleted the only saving clause that directly discussed state
regulation of tank vessel safety; 1284 (4) the importance of the fact that the
operative language of § 1018 is virtually identical to state law saving clauses
in the CWA, CERCLA, and DWPA, none of which has ever been construed
to provide authority for states to engage in the regulation of subjects other
than liability or response; 285 (5) whether the limited saving clause in § 1018
(liability and requirements relating to the discharge or substantial threat of
discharge) implies that laws on any subjects other than such liability and
requirements are impliedly preempted; 28 6 and, (6) whether § 1018 pre-
128 0 ntertanko, 159 F.3d 1220, 1225, 1999 AMC 729 (9th Cir. 1998) (Graber, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
128See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 210 (1983) (construing a state law saving clause in § 274(k) of the Atomic Energy Act and noting
the section "by itself, limits only the pre-emptive effect of 'this section,' that is, § 274, and does not
represent an affirmative grant of power to the States.") (emphasis added); see also Gade v. National Solid
Wastes Mgt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (reasoning that saving clause merely preserved what already
existed and therefore did not create new authority).
128 2Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165, 1978 AMC 527) (1978); see also PG & E, 461
U.S. at 212 (state preempted from regulating the construction or operation of nuclear power plants-even
for a non-safety purpose, because it would contradict safety judgment of the NRC) (dictum).
128 31ntertanko, 159 F.3d at 1222-23 (Graber, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane).
1284See supra Part 1I at note 688 (describing the decision of the Conference Committee to delete
§ 310).
1285See supra Part I at notes 946-57. This question asks whether it is reasonable to conclude, as the
Ninth Circuit did, that simply because other titles of OPA 90 address oil spill prevention, the words
"discharge or substantial threat of discharge" mean something different in OPA 90 than they did in the
CWA and CERCLA. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (state CWA authority to regulate point source discharges does not carry with it the authority to
regulate the point source itself).
'286Cf. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 612-13 (1991) (reasoning that when
Congress expressly limits state regulatory authority, it implies that the states are free to legislate on
subjects outside the limitation provision).
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cludes the Coast Guard from issuing regulations that preempt state authority,
where the agency's rules are promulgated under the authority of OPA 90
itself, other statutes enacted before OPA 90 (the PWSAIPTSA or the
remaining chapters of Title 33 and 46 of the U.S. Code), or statutes or
treaties enacted after OPA 90 (the ISM Code, ratification of the STCW
Convention, and the 1995 STCW Convention changes). 1287
Several considerations will likely guide the Court's decision if the petition
is granted. In examining the preemptive effect of ambiguous federal
legislation, the Court will consider the law's text and its legislative
history. 1288 The text and legislative history of § 1018 and precedents relevant
to its interpretation were analyzed in Parts II and III of this article. 1289 That
earlier discussion highlights the fact that the Conference Committee Report
makes clear that the Supreme Court's decision in Ray was not to be
disturbed by OPA 90.1290 OPA 90 may thus be seen as a legislative
ratification of the Court's rulings in Ray, conferring on the decision a status
beyond that which stare decisis would otherwise provide, rather than as a
statement of intent to undo the "statutory scheme" that informed the Court's
decision in Ray. In determining the preemptive effect of § 1018, the Court
must also determine whether Congress intended to relieve the states of the
preemptive effects of all of the IMO conventions, as the Ninth Circuit
believed. 1291 In reconciling the relationship between statutes and treaties, the
Court will attempt to construe the federal statute consistently with U.S.
treaty obligations, absent clear congressional intent to supersede those
treaties. 292 Finally, the Court will likely consider the Coast Guard's
constructions of the relevant post-OPA 90 regulatory regime if the Court
determines, as did Judge Graber, 1293 that § 1018 is ambiguous. 1294
12871ntertanko, 159 F.3d at 1225-26, (Graber, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
.
2
.Mortier, 501 U.S. at 610 (examining committee reports).
1289See supra Part II at § V.D.2.b and Part III at § VI.C.2.b.
129 0See supra Part 11 at note 689 (citing Conference Report).
129 'Intertanko, 148 F.3d 1053, 1063, 1998 AMC 2113 (9th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied with
dissenting opinion, 159 F.3d 1220, 1999 AMC 729 (9th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W.
3671 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1999) (No. 98-1706). The court reasoned that to reach any other conclusion, "we
would have to read § 1018 to provide that the Act permits state tanker regulations only when the field
in question is not subject to international regulation." Id. Of course, § 1018 does not affirmatively
"permit" state regulation (as would a non-preemption clause that begins with domain-defining language
like "Notwithstanding any other law .... ), it merely saves state law against preemption by "this Act"
(i.e., OPA 90). Neither the text nor the structure of the Act supports the Ninth Circuit's construction that
would extend its effect in derogation of the nation's treaties.
1292Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1981) ("It has been a maxim of statutory construction since
the decision in Murray v. The Charming Betsy ... that 'an act of congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains'); see also Brilmayer, supra note
1072, at 332-41 (analyzing the rule of The Charming Betsy in the context of preemption of state laws).
.
2 93 1ntertanko, 159 F.3d at 1222 (Graber, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
294Mortier, 501 U.S. at 610 & n.4 (examining the opinion of the EPA as amicus). In its rulemaking
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5. Step Five: Conflict Preemption Analysis
Even where Congress has limited the domain occupied exclusively by
federal law, a state statute that lies beyond the occupied field is void to the
extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. 1295 A state law conflicts
with federal law if compliance with both the federal and state regulations is
a physical impossibility, 2 96 or when the state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. 297 Conflicts involving physical impossibility are rare. Therefore,
this section will focus on the frustration of federal purpose test.
The frustration of federal purpose test proceeds in two steps. First, all of
the relevant purposes and objectives of the federal laws are identified.
Second, the court determines the extent to which state action interferes with
the realization of those objectives.'2 98 When the relevant federal law is
found in more than one statute, treaty, or regulation, the court must look not
to the purposes and objectives of any single act, but instead to Congress'
overarching purposes and objectives in the relevant legislative field. 1299 In
this vertical conflict of law analysis, there is no judicial balancing of the
respective federal and state interests to determine which is more compel-
ling.' 300 If state action stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, 301 the state law
must yield. To guard against any tendency to overlook or to selectively
ignore relevant federal purposes or the federal primacy in foreign affairs and
foreign commerce, the proposed approach suggests four relevant "purposes
and objectives" inquiries.
the Coast Guard concluded that "vessel design, construction, equipment and manning standards fall
within the exclusive province of the Federal Government." See supra Part III at note 821 and
accompanying text. The agency's 1997 decision cited Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the decision singled
out by the Conference Report on OPA 90.
1295See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 156, 158, 1978 AMC 527 (1978); Savage v. Jones,
225 U.S. 510, 533 (1912) (dictum). Thus, if the Court concludes that OPA 90 § 1018 limits the
preemptive domain, and permits concurrent state regulation of some subjects (i.e., some of the "field" is
not occupied), state regulation on those subjects will nevertheless be preempted if in actual conflict with
federal law.
1296Ray, 435 U.S. at 158 (quoting Florida Lime &-Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963)) (quotation marks omitted).
12971d. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (quotation marks omitted).
1298The Court generally gives little weight to broad objectives. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 634 (1981) (holding that state law which arguably frustrates "general expressions
of 'national policy"' encouraging production of coal are not, for that reason alone, superseded); Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978) (rejecting preemption challenge to state law
based on claim that the state law frustrated a national policy favoring free competition). The
Constitutional basis for the Court's refusal to consider all relevant federal purposes is not clear.
1299California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989).
13°°See supra notes 1055 and 1093.
130 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (emphasis added).
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a. Statutory Purposes and Objectives
In examining the relevant federal laws to determine whether the chal-
lenged state action stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment or execution
of the federal laws' full purposes and objectives, courts must avoid the
narrow perspective evident in the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Intertanko v.
Locke.1 302 In Intertanko, the circuit court reasoned that only the purposes
and objectives of a single act, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, need be
analyzed, 30 3 and that the purposes and objective of the remaining body of
federal treaties, statutes, and regulations promulgated before and after OPA
90 were irrelevant. The Ninth Circuit's approach treats OPA 90 as though it
was meant to supersede the existing federal pollution prevention and liability
regime, rather than complement certain limited aspects of that regime.t3°4
Fidelity to Article VI requires that the court consider the purposes and
objectives of all relevant federal laws, absent evidence that Congress or the
President had abandoned an objective expressed in an earlier law. The
proposed approach suggests several objectives in the federal marine safety
and pollution prevention statutes that might be considered in a complete
analysis.
(1) To Promote Uniformity Where Feasible
Federal statutes addressing the same subject as the state law under
challenge may reflect a federal objective to establish uniform standards or
practices for an industry. State laws that prescribe standards that are different
from or stricter than the federal standards necessarily undermine uniformity.
Where national or international uniformity is an objective of federal law, the
practical effect is similar to occupation of the field. 30 5 Congress has
acknowledged that the historical preemption in maritime safety matter is
founded on the need for uniformity in regulating vessels moving in interstate
130 2See supra Part Ill at § VI.C.2.d.
1303 See supra Part III at note 1006. Ironically, the circuit court first correctly stated the relevant
inquiry when it cautioned that the court "must look not to the purposes and objectives of any single Act,
but instead to Congress' overarching purposes and objectives in the relevant legislative field." Intertanko
v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing California v. ARC, 490 U.S. at 102). The court then
went on to conclude that OPA 90 reflects the 'full purposes and objectives of Congress" (emphasis in
original) "better than the PWSA, PTSA, or the Tank Vessel Act, all of which OPA 90 was designed to
complement," and then ignored the purposes of those other acts. Id. (emphasis added).
13°4Cf. Posadas v. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (repeals by implication
are not favored). The Court has observed that congressional silence may provide a "treacherous guide to
its intent." Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 271 n.13 (1981). The Court went on to reason that it would be
"almost inconceivable" that Congress would change a "longstanding formula" without a "word of
comment." Id.
1305Tribe, supra Part I at note 204, § 6-26, at 486.
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commerce. 30 6 The Supreme Court recognizes a "special need for unifor-
mity" in foreign commerce. 130 7 Earlier, in Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, the Court distinguished cases involving interstate
carriers because that was a "field of paramount federal concern."' 130 8 In Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the Court concluded that state laws governing
tanker design and construction would "frustrate the congressional desire of
achieving uniform, international standards." 130 9 Uniformity is also a prom-
inent goal in many areas of vessel operatiAns.1310 The Court has recognized
that the federal interest in protecting maritime commerce "can be fully
vindicated only if all operators of vessels on navigable waters are subject to
uniform rules of conduct."'1311
(2) To Foster Reciprocity
The linchpin of the federal regime for foreign vessels is reciprocal
recognition that a foreign vessel's compliance with the IMO regulatory
conventions satisfies the conditions for entry to U.S. ports and waterways on
the subjects covered by the conventions. The U.S. has incorporated a number
of reciprocity provisions into its vessel safety1312 and vessel-source pollution
prevention statutes. 1313 State actions that deny the benefits of reciprocity
afforded by the national government may provoke retaliation by the
aggrieved vessel's flag State, thus undermining a key federal purpose in
reciprocity. 1314 Moreover, it is established that no state may prohibit the
3O6S. Rep. No. 92-248, supra note 1093, at 20-21.
1307 Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
1308373 U.S. 139, 141-42 (1963).
1309435 U.S. 151, 168, 1978 AMC 527 (1978). By contrast, the Court found in Hillsborough County,
Fla. v. Automated Med. Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985), that Congress intended only to establish
minimum standards, not uniform standards. The Court in Ray expressly rejected a similar argument by the
State of Washington.
131°Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893) (federal rules of navigation preempt state rules).
1311Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674-75, 1982 AMC 2253 (1982).
1312See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 3303(a) ("A foreign country is considered to have inspection laws and
standards similar to those of the United States when it is a party to an International Convention for Safety
of Life at Sea to which the United States is currently a party"); 46 U.S.C. § 3711 ("The Secretary may
accept any part of a certificate, endorsement, or document issued by the government of a foreign country
under a treaty, convention, or other international agreement to which the United States is a party, as a
basis for issuing a [U.S.] certificate of compliance"); see also 46 U.S.C. § 5109 (extending reciprocity
under the International Convention on Load Lines); 46 U.S.C. § 14306 (extending reciprocity under the
International Tonnage Convention).
1313See Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (implementing the MARPOL Convention and Protocol),
33 U.S.C. § 1904(b) ("A certificate issued by a country which is party to the MARPOL Protocol has the
same validity as a certificate issued by the Secretary under the MARPOL Protocol.").
1314Cf. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 323-24 (1988) (discussing importance of reciprocity in
international relations).
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exercise of a right granted by federal law, 315 particularly where the state
seeks to exclude a carrier engaged in interstate transportation under federal
authority. 316
(3) To Vest Vessel Safety Decisions in a "Single National
Decisionmaker"
When Congress has prescribed a program of cooperative federalism, the
courts are less likely to find that a state law frustrates the purposes of the
relevant federal law. 1317 While it is true that the U.S. has adopted a program
of cooperative federalism in pollution control and coastal zone manage-
ment, 318 for over 25 years it has followed a program of international
cooperation in vessel safety and vessel-source pollution prevention, together
with a "consultation" relationship with the states. 319 The Supreme Court
found in the PWSA an intent to vest decisions on vessel safety in a "single
national decisionmaker, rather than a different one in each state."1 320 The
Court distinguished the "cooperative federal-state regulatory" regime pre-
scribed by Congress in the CZMA and CWA from the PWSA regime, noting
that in the CZMA and CWA there was no "compelling need for uniformity
in decisionmaking."' 32'
(4) To Provide Discretion to the Secretary to Accept Compliance with
International Standards
In the PWSA/PTSA 1322 and, later, in OPA 90,1323 Congress provided the
Secretary of Transportation discretion to determine whether international
standards provide an adequate level of protection for U.S. waters and to
accept a foreign vessel's compliance with international standards in satis-
faction of U.S. requirements for port entry. State actions that frustrate the
congressional purpose to have the adequacy of international safety standards
13 15Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963).
13t 6See Castle v. Hayes Freight Line, Inc., 348 U.S. 61, 63 (1954); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824). On the other hand, possession of a federal license does not immunize a vessel from
state regulations. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 1977 AMC 566 (1977); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 1960 AMC 1549 (1960).
1317Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 614-15 (1991).
13 18See supra Part III at note 726 and accompanying text.
13 19See supra Part II at § IV.A; see also 46 U.S.C. § 3703(c)(2) and 33 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(2).
132°Ray, 435 U.S. at 178.
132'id. at 178 n.28.
1322These provisions are now codified in 46 U.S.C. § 3711 and 33 U.S.C. § 1228 (conditions for port
entry).
1323See OPA 90 § 4106(a) and (b), 104 Stat. 513-14, codified at 46 U.S.C. § 9101.
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and the safety of individual merchant vessels determined by the Secretary
may give rise to a fatal conflict. 1324
(5) To Provide Flexibility in Vessel Operating Procedures when
Appropriate
State regulations prescribing vessel ope-rating requirements may frustrate
a federal decision to provide needed flexibility to vessel operators, to permit
them to adapt to changing conditions, and to incorporate innovative
technology. The differing approaches of the federal government and the state
of Washington on the question of navigation fix intervals for merchant
vessels provide an example. Congress 325 and the Coast Guard, in its
navigation safety regulations (NSRs), 1326 both rejected an approach that
would prescribe a minimum, specific interval between navigation fixes for
merchant vessels, opting instead to prescribe a general navigation stan-
dard. 1327 By contrast, the Washington Office of Marine Safety (OMS)
prescribed a rule requiring all covered tankers operating in state waters to fix
the vessel's position every 15 minutes.1 328 There is no evidence that
Washington based its rule on any local navigation necessity. On the
contrary, because the rule applies in all waters within the state, the rule
appears to simply reflect a contrary judgment by OMS. The state's attempt
to substitute a rigid rule for the more general federal standard may
undermine the objective of the federal rule, which includes a policy of
providing flexibility to the pilot and master to determine the interval
appropriate to any given waterway. 1329
1324See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (holding that Louisiana's gas tax was preempted
by Congress' decision to delegate the relevant decisions to the FERC).
1325Section 101 of S. 1461 (the Oil Tanker Navigation Safety Act of 1989) would have required
vessels to fix their position every six minutes. See S. Rep. No. 101-99, at 8 (1989). The provision was
deleted from the final OPA 90 legislation.
13261n promulgating the NSRs for vessels over 1,600 tons operating in U.S. waters, the Coast Guard
originally proposed a requirement for such vessels to fix their position every 15 minutes; however, it later
deleted the requirement from its final rule after concluding that it "would not be practicable in all
navigable waters." 42 Fed. Reg. 5,956, 5,957 (1977).
132733 C.F.R. § 164.11.
1328Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-205.
1329Marine navigation technology advances may have rendered the Washington rule obsolete before
it became effective. Integrated radar, GPS/Differential GPS, and electronic chart display systems
installed on many vessels continuously display the vessel's position electronically, obviating the need to
obtain fixes by the methods contemplated by the Washington regulations.
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(6) To Provide Reasonable Time for Implementation
Washington's "vessel management system" requirement for tankers
operating in state waters went into effect on July 7, 1995.1330 By contrast, the
SOLAS amendments establishing the analogous ISM Code requirement and
the U.S. legislation implementing the ISM Code gave tanker owners until
July 1998 to complete the planning and auditing steps necessary to comply
with the new Code. 1331 The state of Rhode Island enacted legislation that
would require tank vessels operating in state waters to meet double hull
construction standards by 2001, while Congress in OPA 90 chose to phase
single hull tankers out over a period ending in 2015.1332 The states' decision
to accelerate the implementation dates over those established by federal law
by up to 15 years raises important questions that are likely to recur regarding
the federal purposes in prescribing a future implementation date to ensure
vessel owners and shipyards have adequate time to comply. Although some
might argue that the states' accelerated compliance date "complements" the
federal safety goal, such reasoning focuses on only one objective (pollution
prevention) while ignoring the objectives that persuaded federal regulators
to delay implementation. The legislative history of OPA 90, for example,
reveals that Congress had other purposes and objectives in mind, including
Congress' concern for the "substantial impact" of the double hull require-
ment on the maritime, oil, and shipbuilding industries, as well as on the
availability of vessels to transport oil. 333
b. Treaty Purposes and Objectives
Where treaties and multilateral conventions form a component of the
governing federal law, no preemption analysis is complete without an
assessment of the purposes and objectives of those international law
instruments.1334 Under international law, a treaty "shall be interpreted in
1330 See Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-260. Interim spill prevention plans were required by January
1, 1993, or upon a vessel's first entry into state waters.
1331See supra Part III at note 1020.
133 2See R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-12.5-24 ("Effective January 1, 2001, no tank vessel shall transport oil
or hazardous material over the waters of this state in any conditions unless the tank vessel (i) has a double
hull or (ii) is accompanied by a tugboat escort."). By contrast, OPA 90 phases out single hull tankers over
a period ending in 2015. See 46 U.S.C. § 3703a. The Rhode Island statute may also overlap with 46
U.S.C. § 3719 (interim measures for single hull tank barges).
133 3See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, at 93-94 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779
(describing Congress' concerns in enacting OPA 90 for the need to balance the goal of prompt
environmental protection against other considerations).
1334See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-32 (1942) ("state law must yield when it is
inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty or of an international compact or
agreement.") (emphasis added).
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good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."' 335
The "context" includes the treaty's preamble and annexes, as well as "any
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty."' 336 The purpose and objective
of the President and the Senate in entering into a treaty, or of federal
agencies in implementing those treaties, may include a desire for interna-
tional uniformity, to provide an incentive for other nations to enhance the
standards applicable to their vessels, to facilitate maritime commerce, or to
obtain reciprocal privileges for U.S. vessels. Reciprocity is plainly a goal in
the VTMS Agreement between the U.S. and Canada, 1337 at issue in the
Intertanko v. Locke challenge. 1338 The various bilateral friendship, com-
merce, and navigation (FCN) treaties are generally intended to obtain
reciprocal benefits, promote commerce, and protect the nationals of one
party while within the jurisdiction of the other. 1339 Relevant FCN treaties
must also be examined to determine whether they grant the flag State
exclusive jurisdiction over the internal affairs of its vessels.1340
Any relevant IMO regulatory convention (together with its implementing
legislation and regulations) must be examined in the conflict preemption
step to determine the extent to which its purpose is to promote uniformity in
standards, reciprocity, and limited port State control. 134 1 The limited port
State control regime embodied in the LOS Convention and the IMO
regulatory conventions preserves the primacy of flag State control, 342
minimizes opportunities for discriminatory treatment of foreign vessels, and
guards against delays in vessel and cargo operations. Uniformity in
standards for instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce facilitates
trade and transportation. 1343 Indeed, the nation's interest in uniformity may
be a "primary function" of an international convention. 1344 International
13 35 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra Part I at note 221, at art. 31(1); see generally
Vagts, Senate Materials and Treaty Interpretation: Some Research Hints for the Supreme Court, 83
Am. J. Int'l L. 546 (1989).
13 36Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra Part I at note 221, at art. 31(2).
13 37 See supra Part II at § IV.B.
1338See supra Part II at note 100 and accompanying text.
13 39FCN treaties may include agreements to extend national treatment to vessels flying the flag of the
parties. See supra Part II at note 454.
134°Sce McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 22 n.2, 1963 AMC
283 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
134 1Congress may elect to incorporate the port State control limitation directly into implementing U.S.
statutes. See, e.g., Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (implementing the MARPOL Convention and
Protocol), 33 U.S.C. § 1904(d).
134 2See supra Part II at § IV.A. 1.
134 3See supra Part III at notes 783-85.
1344Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 230, 1996 AMC 319 (1996) (concluding that
Vol. 31, No. 1
Merchant Vessels 59
cooperation to protect ocean waters and resources both within and beyond
national jurisdictions is a primary purpose of the LOS Convention.1 345 The
Convention requires all nations to cooperate on a regional and global basis,
directly or through competent international organizations, to formulate
international rules and standards to prevent, reduce, and control pollution
from vessels. 1346 The Court in Ray cited Congress' conclusion that "multi-
lateral actions with respect to comprehensive standards for the design,
construction, maintenance and operation of tankers for the protection of the
marine environment would be far preferable to unilateral standards." 1347 In
the years since Ray was decided, the national government has become a
party to the 1978 SOLAS Protocol, the 1973 MARPOL Convention and its
1978 Protocol (MARPOL), and the 1978 STCW Convention. The progress
toward uniformity through multilateral conventions is evident in the broad
international support for the IMO regulatory conventions: 138 nations are
now party to SOLAS, representing over 98% of the world's merchant fleet
by tonnage. 348 Promoting uniformity in vessel CDEM standards is one of
the principal aims of the SOLAS, MARPOL, 349 and Load Line conven-
tions. 1350 By the time the U.S. adopted the 1995 STCW Convention
amendments, 119 nations, representing almost 95% of the world's merchant
fleet tonnage, had become parties to the Convention. ' 35' In implementing the
1995 amendments, the Coast Guard stated that one of the goals of those
undoubtedly it was a "primary function of the Warsaw Convention to foster uniformity in the law of
international air travel") (citing Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991)).
1345See supra Part 1I at § VI.A.
1346See supra Part I at note 389 and accompanying text. Where a treaty is pending Senate advice and
consent, as is the LOS Convention, U.S. actions that would defeat the convention's "object and purpose"
would be contrary to the norms codified in the Vienna Convention. See Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, supra Part I at note 221, at art. 18; United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 1998
AMC 1841 (D.P.R. 1997) (holding that the United States is bound to observe limitations on punishments
for oil spills imposed by the LOS Convention pending its ratification).
1347435 U.S. at 166 (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-724, at 23 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2766)
(emphasis added). A National Research Council study found that in only one instance has the U.S.
adopted a standard that is stricter than that provided for in a governing international convention to which
the U.S. is party. See supra Part III at note 997.
1348See the IMO conventions information database available at www.imo.org/imo/convent/
summary.htm.
13 49See MARPOL, supra Part II at note 388, at Preamble (the parties to the convention consider that
vessel source pollution control "may best be achieved by establishing rules not limited to oil pollution
having a universal purport."). It should also be noted that Annex I to the MARPOL Convention, which
addresses control of oil pollution from vessels, is not one of the "optional" annexes; all parties must agree
to Annex I. See MARPOL art. 14(1) (listing Annexes Ill, IV, and V as the optional annexes).
1350See International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 1857, T.I.A.S. No. 6331, Preamble
("The Contracting Governments, desiring to establish uniform principles and rules . .
115'62 Fed. Reg. 34,506, 34,506 (1997).
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amendments was to prescribe "clear, uniform standards of competence" for
mariners. 1352
c. Foreign Affairs and Foreign Commerce Purposes and Objectives
The potential for state action to encroach on the nation's foreign
affairs 1353 may be brought into focus by framing the question:
Whether a foreign vessel, flying the flag of a party to SOLAS, MARPOL,
STCW and an FCN treaty with the U.S. that extends "national treatment" to
vessels of the other party, that is in full compliance with all applicable
international conventions, and which, by international agreement, is subject to
limited port State control, is nevertheless subject to more stringent state
requirements before it may enter U.S. navigable waters within the state? 3 54
In evaluating the problem it must be borne in mind that any violation of
international law or of an international agreement by a state within the U.S.,
or a denial of comityt 355 or reciprocity benefits, may result in a protest
against the federal government, withdrawal of reciprocal privileges for U.S.
flag vessels, and even national liability for detention damages if a vessel
meeting the applicable international standards is denied entry or detained by
a state in violation of the conventions. 356
The Supreme Court has historically been circumspect in its determination
13521d. (emphasis added).
1353These foreign affairs and commerce concerns may be addressed under the rubric of "comity" or
"international usage," rather than as treaty violations. See, e.g., McDougal & Burke, supra Part I at note
451, at 157 (describing protests against U.S. liquor prohibitions under the Volstead Act by nine nations,
resting their protests on comity and international usage rather than on positive violation of international
law).
'
354See also Bickel, supra Part III at note 740, at 20-21 (opining that interfering with a foreign vessel
while in a U.S. port "may in the eyes of the nation of the flag be deemed an undue interference with her
commerce, and a violation of that 'comity and delicacy' which in the more courtly days of some of the
earlier cases were considered normal among nations").13551n Hilton v. Guyot, the Supreme Court observed that:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere
courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws.
159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
1356See Restatement, supra Part I at note 19, at § 901 ("[u]nder international law, a state that has
violated a legal obligation to another state is required to terminate the violation and, ordinarily, to make
reparation, including in appropriate circumstances restitution or compensation for loss or injury."); The
M/V Saiga (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(July 1, 1999), available at www.un.org/Depts/los/Judg_.E.htm (ordering the government of Guinea to
pay compensation to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in the sum of $2,123,357 plus interest for its
unlawful arrest of the MAV Saiga and the detention of her crew).
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whether U.S. laws apply to the internal affairs of foreign flag vessels in U.S.
ports. 135 7 The "possibility of international discord" supports "the well-
established rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily
governs the internal affairs of a ship."' 358 The national government joined
the challenge to Washington state's tanker regulations in both Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., in 1978, and twenty years later in Intertanko v.
Locke. 359 In Intertanko, the U.S. argued that the Washington tanker
regulations implicated the "immense foreign affairs interests of the United
States in the international maritime field."' 1360 The federal concern stems in
part from the protests by 14 nations and the Commission of the European
Community who cautioned that the Washington regulations set an "unwel-
come precedent for other federally-administered nations."' 36' Yet the Ninth
Circuit's Intertanko decision gives scant attention to the nation's foreign
affairs interests. Examples of state regulations that raised foreign affairs
concerns, yet were upheld by the circuit court, include the Washington drug
testing requirements, which call for tests that the federal government
declined to require out of foreign affairs concerns, 1362 and English language
competency requirements, which may have a discriminatory effect against
foreign vessels and foreign seamen. 363 Although the state's requirements
are likely preempted under the Court's reasoning in Ray concerning PWSA
Title I requirements,1 364 conflict preemption may provide an alternative
basis for preemption.
d. Executive Branch Purposes and Objectives
Federal agencies within the executive branch are closely involved in the
development, drafting, and implementation of the conventions, statutes, and
regulations that constitute the federal law on merchant vessel safety and
vessel-source pollution prevention. In the Act to Prevent Pollution from
Ships, Congress delegated broad rulemaking authority to the Secretary of
1357See, e.g., Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 1957 AMC 900 (1957)
(Taft-Hartley Amendments); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,
1963 AMC 283 (1963) ("we find no basis for a construction [of the National Labor Relations Act] which
would exert United States jurisdiction over and apply its laws to the internal management and affairs of
[foreign vessels] contrary to the recognition long afforded to them not only by our State Department but
also by the Congress.") (citations omitted).
135 8McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21 (citations omitted).
1359See supra Part III at § VI.C.2; Ray, 435 U.S. at 156.
136°See supra Part I at note 7 and accompanying text.
1361See supra Part I at notes I and 2.
136 2See supra Part III at note 936.
136 3See Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-250.
1364See Ray, 435 U.S. at 171-72 (once the Coast Guard has exercised its authority to prescribe
regulations, the states are preempted from prescribing higher safety standards) (dictum).
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Transportation to carry out the provisions of the MARPOL Convention and
Protocol without further implementing legislation. 365 The PWSA directs the
Secretary to prescribe regulations that "may be necessary"'' 366 and authorizes
the Secretary to deny entry to a foreign vessel not in compliance with any
applicable treaty or statute.1367 In OPA 90, Congress directed the Secretary
to evaluate the manning, training, qualification, and watchkeeping standards
of the other maritime nations that issue documents to tank vessels, to
determine whether the standards are equivalent to U.S. standards or the
international standards accepted by the U.S.1368 The agencies' purposes and
objectives in carrying out their broad mandate must be considered in any
conflict preemption analysis. As agencies begin to give greater care to their
preemption analyses, and to articulate the purposes and objectives of their
regulations, the usefulness of the agencies' conclusions regarding conflicts
between state laws and the federal regime will be enhanced.
Federal agencies are "uniquely qualified" to provide the executive
branch's views on whether a state regulation is likely to frustrate the
purposes and objectives of the federal regulatory scheme. 1369 The Coast
Guard's Port State Control Initiative reflects the agency's objectives as the
port State control authority for the U.S. 370 State actions that frustrate the
agency's objective to establish a consistent national regime for control over
foreign vessels must be examined under the conflict preemption step. In
addition to the rulemaking authority under the PWSA/PTSA and other
federal statutes and treaties, the Secretary of Transportation has been
delegated the responsibility for general superintendence of the U.S. mer-
chant marine and merchant marine personnel.' 37 1 The Department of
Transportation concluded in its 1996 Statement of Regulatory Priorities that
"[t]hrough Coast Guard initiatives at the International Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO), international standards have been raised to a level comparable
with U.S. domestic requirements."1 372 As a result, the Coast Guard has
launched a regulatory initiative designed to harmonize standards applicable
136533 U.S.C. § 1903(b).
136646 U.S.C. § 3703(a).
136733 U.S.C. §§ 1228(a)(2) and 1223(b)(2).
1368See 46 U.S.C. § 9101(a).
'
36 9See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) (federal agency to which Congress has
delegated authority to implement an act is "uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form of
state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress,' and therefore, whether it should be pre-empted."); see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959) (deferring to an agency's determination that state regulation would
interfere with the national policy).
1370 See supra Part II at note 558.
""7146 U.S.C. § 2103.
137 2U.S. Dep't of Transp., Unified Agenda, Nov. 29, 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 62,111 (1996).
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to U.S. vessels with those prescribed by the IMO regulatory conventions.1 373
The harmonization initiative is designed in part to eliminate any competitive
disadvantage to U.S. vessels that would attach if they were required to meet
standards that are more stringent than their foreign competition. 374 If the
states are permitted to impose more stringent requirements on U.S. vessels,
while being preempted by treaties from imposing those same requirements
on foreign vessels, the federal goal might be frustrated. Where Congress or
the administering agency "has struck a particular balance between safety and
quantity," state laws that strike a different balance produce a conflict. 1375
VIII
CONCLUSION
In an era when over 90% of the goods traded globally are shipped by
ocean carriers, few would dispute the need for an effective regulatory regime
to promote merchant vessel safety and vessel-source pollution prevention.
Disagreement may arise among internationalists, nationalists, and localists,
however, when the discussion turns to just which government should
undertake the regulation. At the international level, agreement has now been
reached on the respective roles of flag States and port States, and on the need
for international rules and standards. But while there may be agreement
within the international community, there is ferment in the capitols of
several states within the U.S. over who should regulate those vessels when
they enter the waters of the state.
The crux of the question facing the Supreme Court if it grants certiorari
in Intertanko v. Locke will be whether the federal judgments that the IMO
regulatory conventions strike an acceptable balance between protection of
the marine environment and facilitation of global trade and transportation,
and whether a vessel is safe to navigate in U.S. waters, are to prevail over
a contrary judgment by state or local governments. Those of us who see
value in the uniformity that comes with international standards and the
balanced approach to the use of the sea offered by the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention, see in state initiatives like Washington's a threat to the
emerging international regime.
Justice Holmes cautioned that "I do not think the United States would
1373 See supra Part II at note 553.
13 74 See 62 Fed. Reg. 51,188, 51,188 (1997).
1375Cf. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721 (1985)
(rejecting an argument that local regulation of plasma supplies conflicted with federal law by restricting
the supply of plasma, the Court observed that neither Congress nor the implementing agency had struck
a particular balance. The Court went on to note that if the FDA became concerned about the supply, they
were free to preempt the local regulations. Id.).
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come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I
do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make the declaration
as to the laws of the several states." 1376 No one would reasonably argue that
the Republic is imperiled by the recent state maritime regulatory initiatives.
There is, however, reason to fear that the nation's leadership role in the
development of public order in international marine safety and pollution
prevention will be undermined if states within the nation are free to chart an
independent course.
13760. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 295-96 (1920).
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